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The concepts of closer cooperation and flexibility are fairly recent additions
to European law and policy. These notions essentially refer to the policies and
procedures within the Union whereby some member states undertake certain
obligations, or participate with some other member states in certain agreed
upon activities, while other member states do not participate, or participate on
a different scale or on a different timetable. Explicit reference to the concept
of "closer cooperation" in the European Union's constitutive documents, or
authorization of it, is recent. Provisions regarding "closer cooperation" appear
for the first time in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty ("AT").' But only three
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TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J.
(C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter AT]. The AT consists of a series of amendments to the TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992) (also known as the MAASTRICHT
TREATY) [hereinafter TEU] and to THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by, among other agreements, the
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, 1987, O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987) [hereinafter
TREATY OF ROME].
Because ofthe various amendments to the Treaties and the uncoordinated manner in which
the Treaties relate to one another, it is often difficult to identify the substance of a specified treaty
provision. The following general comments might be helpful. The Treaty on European Union,
as signed in Maastricht in 1992, introduced several new areas into European law and affairs. It
also incorporated the Treaty of Rome into itself, amended some of its provisions and changed
its name to the Treaty Establishing the European Community. For clarity, throughout this article
the term "TEU" is used to refer to the Treaty on European Union; the term "TEC" is used to refer
to the Treaty of Rome as included within, amended and renamed by the TEU. In turn, the AT
consists of amendments to both the TEU and the TEC. The term "Community" is used to refer
to the entity created by the Treaty of Rome, as amended. The term "Union" is used to refer to
the broader set of relationships and obligations created by the TEU, the TEC and the AT. The
term "Maastricht Treaty" is used when referring to the Treaty on European Union, and its
provisions, in the form agreed to in 1992.
After adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Union was often described as an
architecture of three pillars, as a means of distinguishing among its parts. See generally
ANTHONY ARNULL ET AL., WYATT & DASHWOOD's EUROPEAN UNION LAW 169-87 (4th ed.
2000) [hereinafter WYATT & DASHWOOD]. At the outset of the Maastricht Treaty some Common
Provisions are set out. See TEU tit. 1. The Treaty of Rome is then restated, amended and
renamed as the first pillar ofthe Union architecture. See TEU tit. II. The second pillar consisted
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years later these provisions were augmented and restated in a modified form
in the Union's most recent constitutive document, the Treaty of Nice,2 which
was agreed to by the fifteen member states of the Union on December 11, 2000
at the conclusion of the Nice Summit?
of provisions regarding the common foreign and security policy (the CFSP). See TEU tit. V.
The third pillar consisted of provisions dealing with visa, asylum and immigration matters and
provisions dealing with police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. See TEU tit. VI.
The Maastricht Treaty concludes with some Final Provisions. See TEU tit. VII.
The AT consists separately of amendments to the TEU and to the TEC. Part One of the AT
contains the substantive amendments to the Treaties. Article 1 of Part One (1999 O.J. (C 340)
7-24) contains the amendments to those parts of the TEU other than the TEC. Article 2 of Part
One (1999 O.J. (C 340) 24-50) contains the amendments to the TEC. Following the AT in the
Official Journal are Consolidated Versions of the TEU (other than the TEC) including the
changes made by the AT (1999 O3. (C 340) 145-172) and of the TEC also including the AT
changes (1999 O.. (C 340) 173-306).
Throughout this article it is necessary to distinguish the AT's amendments to the TEU
(other than the TEC) from its amendments to the TEC. To do so the term "AT Article
is used when referring to amendments to the TEU (other than the TEC) and "TEC Article '
is used to refer to the amendments to the TEC. The text of the AT articles referred to are found
in the Consolidated Version of the TEU and the text of the TEC articles are found in the
Consolidated Version of the TEC. Unless otherwise indicated, references in this article are to
the text of the provisions in the Consolidated Versions.
The AT provided that the provisions of the entire TEU, including the TEC as amended,
should be renumbered. AT art. 12 (1999 O.J. (C 340) 73; Annex, Tables of Equivalences
Referred to in Article 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997 O.J. (C 340) 85-91). This
renumbering was to be done after the text of the AT was agreed to; thus the provisions of the text
of the AT itself were also renumbered. Since the AT separately amends the TEU (other than the
TEC) and the TEC, this renumbering is confusing. The renumbering of the TEU (other than the
TEC) results in articles I through 53 of the Consolidated Version of the TEU. Then the
renumbering begins again as articles I through 314 in the Consolidated version of the TEC. As
adopted, the provisions of in the AT amending the TEU (other than the TEC) were designated
by letter, not number. The renumbering changed the letters to numbers. Throughout this Article,
references are to the treaty provisions as renumbered. Where helpful, the old letter or number
reference is also given.
2 TREATY OF NICE AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrTIEs AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, February 26, 2001,
O.J. (C 80) 1 (2001) [hereinafter TREATY OF NICE].
' See Robin Oakley, EUDeal Paves Expansion Path, CNN.COM, Dec. 11, 2000, at http://
www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/12/1 1/nice.agree/index.html. In fact, the time between the
Amsterdam and Nice treaties was less than two years, as the AT did not become effective until
May 1, 1999. By its terms, the AT became effective on the first day of the second month after
the last instrument of ratification was deposited. AT art. 14(2). The substantive provisions of
the Treaty of Nice were agreed to at the conclusion of the Nice Summit. During the following
two months the final text of the treaty was prepared. The member states then signed the final text
in February, 2001. See Associated Press, EUMinisters Sign Treaty of Nice, CNN.CoM, Feb.
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The Treaty of Nice became effective as an amendment to the TEU on
February 1, 2003, upon the ratification by all fifteen member states, according
to their respective constitutional or administrative procedures." In June 2001,
the Treaty of Nice was rejected by the citizens of the Republic of Ireland,
voting in a referendum as provided in the Irish Constitution; but in a second
referendum, held in October 2002, the Irish voters approved the Treaty.' The
inclusion of cooperation provisions in the Treaty of Nice in a form different
from those of the AT provides an opportunity to consider these less familiar
aspects of European Union law and policy as contained in both instruments.
I. THEORY OF CLOSER COOPERATION OR FLEXIBILITY
Closer cooperation allows some member states to commit themselves to an
agreed-upon activity while other member states choose not to participate in it.
It also allows a variation in the degree of participation or the timing of
participation. Closer cooperation, as the term is used in the AT, is the
language of the treaty establishing procedures whereby member states are
authorized to engage in some forms of differentiated activity.6 Enhanced
cooperation is the term used in the English version of the Treaty of Nice with
respect to those same types of provisions.7 The term "flexibility" includes
closer cooperation or enhanced cooperation, but it is also used to refer to the
broader issues surrounding the accommodation of difference or diversity of
obligation within the Union and its constitutional structure and governance.8
26, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001IWORLD/europe/02/16/nice.treaty/.
' By its terms, the Treaty of Nice became effective on the first day of the second month after
the last member state's instrument of ratification was deposited. TREATY OFNICE art. 12.2. The
last instrument of ratification, that of the Republic of Ireland, was deposited on December 18,
2002. Hence the Treaty of Nice is effective as of February 1, 2003. See EU-Final Barrier to
Implementation of Nice Treaty Lifted, EUROPEAN REP., Dec. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL
104382172.
' See Audrey Magee, Ireland's Voters Reject Europe's Eastward Spread, TIMES (London),
June 9, 2001, at News 6; David Lister, Defeat Leads to Damage Limitation in Brussels, TIMES
(London), June 9,2001, at News 6. Denis Staunton, EU heaves collective sigh of relief at news,
IRISH TIMES, October 21, 2002, at News 5. In Ireland, approval of the Treaty of Nice by a
popular referendum was required since the treaty necessitated amendments to the Irish
Constitution. TREATY OF NICE, WHITE PAPER (2001), point 2.9.
6 In fact, one of the titles within the AT is captioned "Provisions on Closer Cooperation."
AT tit. VII.
7 See TREATY OF NICE pt. One, 6.
a See, e.g., CoNsTTrUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY?
(Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2000) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE];
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Use of the closer cooperation procedures afforded by the AT would result in
or achieve some degree of flexibility of differentiated action and commitment
within the Union.
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Intergovernmental
Conference ("IGC") which led up to it provided the impetus for extensive
discussion of flexibility and examination of its implications. That debate
intensified in the mid-1990s up to and after the adoption of the AT. However,
seminal articulation of the concept was considerably earlier.9
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AFTER AMSTERDAM: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND PROSPECTS FOR
DEMOCRACY (Karlheinz Neunreither & Antje Wiener eds., 2000); FLEXiBUITY IN CONSTrru-
TIONS: FORMS OF CLOSER COOPERATION IN FEDERAL AND NON FEDERAL SETTINGS (Annette
Schrauwen ed., 2002) [hereinafter FLEXIBILITY IN CONSTITUTIONS]. It has been suggested that
it might have been more appropriate to have used the term "flexibility" rather than "closer
cooperation" in the AT. See generally Giorgio Gaja, How Flexible is Flexibility under the
Amsterdam Treaty?, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 855 (1998). The term flexibility would, in a
single, relatively understandable word, suggest that the member states were to be allowed some
measure of freedom to take steps toward integration not taken by others. See id. at 855-56
(Professor Gaja suggests that the term "closer cooperation" was chosen because of its neutrality.
While perhaps not as precise as "flexibility," the term "closer cooperation" avoids the political
emotion surrounding such alternative terms as "two-tier Europe," "variable geometry" or perhaps
most evocative of all, "Europe a la carte." See id. Professor Jo Shaw notes that the change in
terminology from flexibility to closer cooperation is symptomatic of a trend "towards deleting
or at least largely concealing the rich, if contradictory, ideological heritage brought into play by
flexibility." Jo Shaw, The Treaty ofAmsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy, 4
EUR. L.J. 63,69 (1998) [hereinafter Challenges of Flexibility]. See also Alexander C.G. Stubb,
A Categorization of Differentiated Integration, 34 J. COMMON. MKT. STUD. 283 (1996)
[hereinafter Differentiated Integration] (noting general ignorance of political leaders' visions
in European Parliament debate on multi-speed Europe).
' See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, European Community: How Flexible is Community
Law? An UnusualApproach to the Concept of "Two Speeds ", 82 MICH. L. REV. 1274 (1984)
[hereinafter How Flexible is Community Law]. Mr. Ehlermann ascribes the origin of the
flexibility concept to Willy Brandt, who opened the "two speed" debate. Chancellor Brandt
noted in 1974 that "the Community might progress faster if its economically stronger Member
States were allowed to develop more quickly." Id. at 1274. See also European Union: Report
by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium to the European Council, 1976 BULL E.
COMM. Supp. 1 [hereinafter Tindemans Report]. In discussing economic and monetary policy,
Prime Minister Tindemans noted that those states which are able to progress in this area must
press ahead. Id. at 20-21. Those with reasons for not doing so which the Council deems valid
will not do so, but will be given aid from the others to enable them to catch up. Id.; see Eberhard
Grabitz & Bernd Langeheine, Legal Problems Related to a Proposed "Two-Tier System" of
Integration within the European Community, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 33 (1981).
For bibliographies of works dealing with flexibility, see CONSTITUTIONALCHANGE, supra
note 8; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 163; Shaw, Challenges ofFlexibility, supra note
8, at 64-65 n.5-10; Jose M. de Arezila, Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam:
[Vol. 31:265
AMSTERDAM OR NICE
Uniformity is a fundamental touchstone of Union philosophy. Although a
member state retains the ultimate, but practically speaking, unlikely, option of
withdrawing from the Union, it does not as a member have the luxury of
selective application of Union law. ° Uniform and unanimous implementation
of Community obligations is a bedrock principle of Community law."
Provisions in the Treaties wherein the member states agree that decisions taken
constitute acts of the Union, and agree to accept them and implement them as
such, certainly foster this principle of uniformity and solidarity. 2 Moreover,
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice that establishes the principle of the
uniform, binding nature of its decisions reinforces this notion. 3 On the other
hand, the concept of flexibility or differentiation has been embedded in the
Treaties from the formation of the Community in 1957; uniformity therefore
has always been slightly diluted.'
Some Critical Remarks (Mar. 1998), at http://jeanmonnetprograms.org/papers/98/98-13.html;
Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Co-operation: The New Provisions
of the Amsterdam Treaty, 4 EUR. L.J. 246,270 (1998) [hereinafter Differentiation, Flexibility].
"0 See Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supernationalism, 1
Y.B. OF EUR. L. 267, 297 (1987); see also Eric Philippart & Monika Sie Dhian Ho, From
Uniformity to Flexibility. The Management of Diversity and its Impact on the EU System of
Governance, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 8, at 299.
Baroness Thatcher recently argued that the United Kingdom should begin a process of
withdrawing from the Union. She advocated a renegotiation of British membership in such a
way that Britain could withdraw from some Union policies, such as the common agricultural and
fishing policies and the common foreign and security policy. The point was made then that the
other member states would not agree to allow the United Kingdom to selectively accept some
Union obligations, but not others. See Philip Webster, Thatcher: Britain must start to quit EU,
TIMEs (London), Mar. 18, 2002, at News 1; Martin Fletcher & Gary Duncan, Member states
would never let Britain go, TIMES (London), Mar. 18, 2002, at News 2.
" D. LASOK, LAw & INsTrruTONs OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 38-42 (6th ed. 1994); Philippe
Manin, The Treaty of Amsterdam, 4 CoLuM. J. EUR. L. 1, 18 (1998). See generally J.H.H.
WEMLER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 10-63 (1999). Europe a la carte, an extreme form of
flexibility, is the antithesis of uniformity. It would allow all members to apply Union decisions
selectively in all areas. See Fletcher, supra note 10, regarding Union reaction to Baroness
Thatcher's proposal for selective application of Union law and policies.
" See, e.g., TEU arts. 7, 11(2), 43(2); TEC arts. 226-28. See P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P.
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 148-62
(Laurence W. Gormley ed., 3d ed. 1998).
" See, e.g., Case 168/85, Commission v. Italy, 1986 E.C.R. 2945; Case 6/64, Costa v.
ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
,' For an exposition of differentiation in the Treaties, the secondary legislation and the
decisions of the Court of Justice, see HowFlexible is Community Law, supra note 9, at 1279-87.
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The Treaty of Rome's transitional provisions and its allowance of a
separate regional arrangement for the Benelux counties demonstrates this. 5
The different law making instruments created in the Treaty of Rome also
contribute to this unsettledness. The Treaty of Rome created two distinct
legislative forms, the regulation and the directive.' 6 The regulation is a single
act, binding upon the member states in the text as adopted, from its effective
date.' 7 The directive, being a direction to the member states to enact their own
national measures with respect to the subject covered, 8 tolerates different
formulations and certainly different effective dates. The Treaty provision
creating the directive expressly sanctions differences among the national
formulations in that the directive "shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and method."' 9 The directive generally sets forth a date by
which the national measures are to be effective, and the treaty language does
demand uniformity of result." Thus any lack of uniformity with respect to
directive legislation ought to be modest. Yet the numerous cases dealing with
the consequence of a member state's failure to enact a directive by the stated
date attest to the Union's willingness to counter the threat to uniformity posed
by directives only in an incomplete manner. The cases do find some degree of
uniformity and ability to bind despite a member state's failure to enact the
necessary legislation." Also, the Maastricht Treaty's provision authorizing the
11 See TEC art. 306. For an example of the grant of separate dates for Sweden to accept
community policies concerning the Union's fishing quota scheme and to implement various
environmental standards, see Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of
Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the
Adjustments to the Treaties on Which the European Union is Founded, pt. 4, tit. V, ch. 1, § 1,
at 112, 1994 O.J. (C 241), 41-42.
16 See TEC art. 249.
'" See TEC art. 249; see generally WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 84-89; STEPHEN
WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAW 150 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter EU LAW].
"s TEC art. 249; see generally WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 89-104; EU LAW,
supra note 17, at 151-52.
" TEC art. 249; Case 252/85, Commission v. France, 1988 E.R.C. 2243, at 2263 and Case
262/85, Commission v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 3073, at 3097 (holding that the text of the legislation
need not be the same); Case 163/82, Commission v. Italy, 1983 E.C.R. 3273, at 3286-87
(holding that the choice of legislative form is left to the member states),
20 TEC art. 249 states that the directive is "binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State ... "
21 See, e.g., Case 106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Intemacional de Alimentacion,
SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135 (holding that domestic law of a state not enacting a directive by the
stated date is deemed to be changed so as to conform to the directive); Case 41/74, Van Duyn
v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (holding that some directives, although unenacted by the
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Court to impose damages against a state which fails to fulfill its obligations is
an effort to enforce uniformity, but the ambiguity is tolerated inasmuch as
there has not been a serious effort to reduce the incidence of differentiation by
eliminating the directive as a legislative instrument.'
Uniformity of commitment or obligation among the member states has
several advantages. Clarity of obligation is one. The solidarity and identity
among the member states resulting from that clarity is another. The member
states, persons residing within them, and the outside world, have no doubt as
to the Union's position or commitment on an issue. Also, the uniformity of
obligation and the mutuality of interest flowing from it fosters integration
among the member states.
The concept of flexibility within Union affairs is destabilizing in many
respects. It is completely at cross purposes with the notions of uniformity and
solidarity. Second, while the notion of uniformity is clear, there is no
definition of flexibility. Flexibility undercuts uniformity, thereby blurring the
Union's position on, or commitment to, an issue. It poses a risk to the
integration process accomplished through such uniformity,23 and threatens the
integrity of the Union's legal order.2 One disadvantage of uniformity,
however, is that it tends to slow the progress toward integration. While the
Union's position might be clear, it can go no farther or evolve no faster than
qualified majority voting, to say nothing of unanimous voting, allows.
Moreover, enlargement of the Union membership increases the Union's
heterogeneity, which in turn decreases the likelihood of effective governance
by unanimity or even qualified majority voting.25
stated date, can be considered to be directly applicable and directly effective).
" TEC art. 228. See also Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Andrea Francovich & Daniela Bonifaci
et al. v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357 (noting that inherent in the Treaties is the principle
that member states must compensate individuals for damages caused by their failure to fulfill
their Community legal obligations).
" Jo Shaw, European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic, 16 OXFORD
J. LEG. STuD. 231, 239 (1996).
4 Stephen Weatherill, BeyondPreemption? Shared Competence and Constitutional Change
in the European Community, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 13, 22 (David
O'Keefe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994) [hereinafter Beyond Preemption?].
" Early discussion offlexibility assumed that use ofqualified majority voting in Community
decision making would reduce the need to resort to flexibility. Ehlermann, How Flexible is
Community Law, supra note 9, at 1274. Qualified majority voting would allow effective
decision making in a larger number of cases, thereby preserving uniformity despite heterogene-
ity, and in turn the increased number of effective decisions taken would intensify integration.
Other early discussion of flexibility would limit resort to flexibility only in areas of decision
making that require unanimity. Ehlermann, How Flexible is Community Law, supra note 9, at
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Flexibility is a fulcrum by which it is thought that uniformity and solidarity
can be balanced with the aspirations of some member states to intensify
integration among themselves and better manage an enlarged Union.26
While the concept of uniformity is fairly clear, not only does flexibility blur
the Union's position, but also the concept of flexibility is itself unclear. One
can readily distinguish at least three different understandings of flexibility.
The mildest and least disturbing to uniformity is "two speed" or "multi speed"
flexibility. In this variant, some member states commit to a position by a
defined time, with the understanding that the others will follow later or will
catch up. 7 In this variant, uniformity is only minimally disturbed, because at
some point all of the member states will have reached the agreed upon
position. There is uniform agreement as to the ultimate position, and the only
question is the timetable for arriving at that position. The transitional
allowances in the Treaties are precisely this form of flexibility."8
At the other extreme is the view of flexibility leading to Europe a la carte.
Under this view, member states can determine which Union obligations they
wish to undertake or in which initiatives they would like to participate, with
only a minimum of a common base which all members must accept.29 This
1276 (discussing Bernd Lageheine, Abgestufie Integration, 18 EUR. 227, 254-55 (1983)). As
time passed, flexibility and qualified majority voting were not viewed as alternative, inconsistent
means of facilitating effective Union action. The IGC leading to the Treaty of Nice had as two
of its agenda items increased use of qualified voting and reform of closer cooperation to make
it more useable. See infra notes 185-86, and 197-98 and accompanying text.
2 See Anne Marie Lansdaal, Differentiation or Enhanced Cooperation: Formalizing
Flexibility, in FLEXIB1L1TY IN CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 49.
27 See Differentiated Integration, supra note 8, at 287.
28 Chancellor Brandt did not view flexibility so narrowly. See supra note 9. Other early
persuasive discussion of the concept did, however. Prime Minister Tindemans noted that a
member state should be allowed not to accept the same obligations as the others for reasons
acceptable to the Council, but the understanding was that ultimately, and with assistance from
the other members, the non-complying state would catch up. Tindemans Report, supra note 9,
at 21.
Article 7 of the TEC is another example of this modest form of flexibility. Article 7
articulates the Single European Act's goal, that the internal market be established by December
31, 1992. TEC art 7a. In drawing up proposals necessary to achieve the single internal market,
the Commission was directed to take into account the greater burden its proposals would place
on some member states because of the difference in their state of economic development; and
it was authorized to make appropriate allowances for those differences. If the allowances took
the form of derogation from an obligation, such derogation was to be temporary. TEC art. 7c.
See Alexander C.G. Stubb, The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference on the Management of
Flexible Integration, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 37, 44 (1997).
29 Differentiated Integration, supra note 8, at 288. See supra note 10 regarding Baroness
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approach clearly carries with it the possibility of significant deterioration of
uniformity and a serious blurring of the identity of the Union. Taken to the
extreme, this view undercuts the whole notion of unity even in areas of
exclusive Community competence. The member states are deemed to have
ceded their sovereign decision making rights in certain areas to the Union
institutions.30 Any thought that a member state can select for itself those
commitments it chooses is antithetical to the notion of exclusive Community
competence. Even if areas of exclusive competence were deemed to be the
residual common core in which uniformity must not be disturbed, Union
solidarity and effectiveness could be seriously eroded if member states were
free to decide whether or not to accept any other measure. This is not the view
of flexibility contemplated in the AT and the Treaty of Nice.
Between these two poles is the view of flexibility which allows completely
different participation with respect to some ill-defined class of measures.
Under this view, there is a clear difference of commitment among the member
states, not merely a difference in the time necessary to reach a uniformly
agreed upon position. This is the form of flexibility, referred to as "variable
geometry," that is incorporated into the AT and the Treaty of Nice. One of the
distinctions between the closer cooperation formulations in these two treaties
is the different delineation of the ambit of areas of permissible cooperation or
variable geometry.3'
Uniformity results in clarity of position. While the member states may
vote, under either the unanimity or qualified majority procedures, from the
perspective of their own national interest, the measure, if adopted, is that of the
Union. National agendas or views with respect to that measure cease to be
overriding. In contrast, flexibility leads to less clarity in the Union's position.
Thatcher's suggestion that the United Kingdom attempt to re-negotiate its treaty commitments
along the lines of Europe a la carte.
30 See Opinion 1/94, Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, 1994 E.C.R. I-
5267 (the WTO case); Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263 (the E.R.T.A.
case).
31 See Lansdaal, supra note 26, at 50-51; Differentiated Integration, supra note 8, at 287.
The difference in formulations is accomplished both by treaty provisions authorizing closer
cooperation within certain Treaty spheres and, at least as importantly, by the various substantive
qualifications which a proposed closer cooperation measure must meet. See infra notes 137,
147-64, 232-36 and accompanying text. One way of distinguishing variable geometry from
Europe a la carte is that in the latter, member states might be able to determine unilaterally
which Union obligations they will accept, whereas under variable geometry the member states
collectively grant a given member state the right to determine whether or not to participate in a
Union-based initiative.
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It is also a means by which the various, and perhaps inconsistent, national
agendas continue to dominate the issue.
Flexibility is a pragmatic tool whereby the political, social, and other
agendas of the member states can be accommodated. Understandably, there
is not one such agenda among the member states; there may be several
agendas, some of which are inconsistent. a2 Several of these disparate agendas
can be accomplished through flexibility. The more prevalent justification for
the use of flexibility is that while certain member states are reluctant to
participate in some measures fostering integration, others wish to pursue that
same measure.3 Multilateral treaties, or other agreements which sanction such
less than unanimous action, support the momentum for integration. Con-
versely, a unanimity requirement which allows a proposed measure to be
completely thwarted, frustrates, or at least decelerates, the drive for integra-
tion.
An advantage of flexibility under this description is the fact that it allows
for different political or social judgments by the member states.34 A different
justification asserts that flexibility is a means of compensating for the
"inadequacy" or "incapacity" of a member state. A state which is not capable
of undertaking the commitment entailed in participation in a Union initiative
at a given time need not hold back other members who are capable and wish
to proceed.35
32 See Neil Walker, Flexibility within a Metaconstitutional Frame: Reflections on the Future
of Legal Authority in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 8, at 9, 10-12.
" See Gaja, supra note 8, at 858.
The current differences among the member states regarding monetary union and the
different positions taken under the Maastricht Treaty with respect to the Union's social
provisions demonstrate this idea. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
" See Gaja, supra note 8, at 858. This "incapacity" characterization has been cited with
respect to Greece's initial decision not to participate in the monetary union. It was thought that
Greece could not meet the necessary economic convergence criteria within the established time
frame. Id. Thus, other members who wished to participate were able to agree on the timetable
and procedures for monetary union without waiting for Greece. Ultimately Greece did meet the
criteria and joined the euro-zone in January 2001, two years later than the January 1999 date
when the euro became an effective currency among the other eleven participating member states.
The euro was established as an effective currency on January 1, 1999 among Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal.
See Timetable, http://europa.cv.int/curo/htmllrubrique-cadre5.html?pay=calcudrier5.html (last
modified Sept. 3, 2001). Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom remain outside the euro-
zone and do not participate in Union institutional discussions or votes on matters relating to the
monetary union. This inability of member states to engage in an action at the same time, or to
the same degree, is the situation Prime Minister Tindemans argued justified flexibility. He did
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While some member states view flexibility as advantageous for the above
described reasons, others view the same consequences of flexibility as
desirable for a different reason. A less monolithic, more diffuse Union is
inherently a less powerful entity.36 The more instances there are of flexibility
in action, that is instances where fewer than all of the member states agree to
adopt and implement certain initiatives, the more likely it will be that member
states seek solutions to issues of mutual concern outside the usual Union
decision-making framework." In turn, the more instances there are of extra-
Union activity by the member states, the less powerful and cohesive the Union
becomes.
II. FLEXIBILITY WITHIN THE MAASTRICHT TREATY
The AT's "codification" of flexibility in the freestanding closer cooperation
procedures marks a remarkable shift in approach and emphasis within the
Union. The Maastricht Treaty did not highlight flexibility by creating
separate, freestanding provisions for closer cooperation. Rather, it contained
two extremely important functional examples of this concept, each following
a different model of allowance. Indeed, these examples of flexibility in the
Maastricht Treaty fueled the later debate over closer cooperation."
The monetary union established in Title VI of the Treaty of Rome, as
amended by the Maastricht Treaty,39 sets forth the timetable and sequence for
establishing monetary union.4' The monetary union provisions are contained
within the first pillar of the Union's architecture, that of the Community, and
are thus binding on all member states.4' Indeed, the language of Title VI reads
not view a different political agenda as warranting differences. See Tindemans Report, supra
note 9.
36 See Walker, supra note 32, at 10-11.
" Helmut Kortenberg, Closer Cooperation in the Treaty ofAmsterdam, 35 COMMON MKT.
L. REv. 833,835 (1998) (flexibility is seen by others as desirable because it decreases members'
resort to extra-Union agreements).
31 See supra notes 8 and 9.
39 MAAsTRIC-T TREATY, Title II, European Economic Community, arts. 102(a)-109(m);
together with the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank, 1992 0.J. (C 224) 104; and the Protocol on the Statute of the European
Monetary Institute, 1992 0.1. (C 224) 115.
' See, e.g., MAASTRICHT TREATY arts. 109(e) and 1090); Protocol on the Transition to the
Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 123.
41 It is true that, by their terms, these provisions do allow the Council to determine whether
or not a member state should be granted a derogation from the obligations of the monetary union.
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as though all member states were participating. But by separate protocols
attached to the Maastricht Treaty, the United Kingdom and Denmark were
allowed not to be bound by these provisions until they separately agreed to
accept them.42 At one level, the monetary union provisions bound all member
states, but on a separate level, all of the member states agreed that the United
Kingdom and Denmark would not be bound by these provisions unless they
separately agreed. Hence, uniformity and solidarity were preserved on one
level. Also, all of the member states agreed in the protocols that the United
Kingdom and Denmark would not be bound unless they separately opted in.43
A different form of flexibility was employed in the Maastricht Treaty with
respect to social policy. In the Social Policy Protocol attached to the
Maastricht Treaty," eleven of the then twelve Union members (all but the
United Kingdom) agreed to be bound by the terms of the Social Policy
Agreement.4" In this variant of flexible action there was no pretense of
unanimity as there was with respect to the monetary union provisions. There,
all member states agreed to be bound by Title VI, and subsequently all member
states separately agreed that the United Kingdom and Denmark would not be
bound. The Social Policy Protocol and Agreement, in contrast, were clearly
agreements only among the eleven signatories.' In one area of commonality,
See MAASTRICHT TREATY art. 109(kX1). This derogation provision is intended to allow the
Council to exempt from the monetary union member states which do not meet the strict
convergence criteria for participation. It is not intended as a means whereby states meeting the
criteria could request to opt out. It also follows from Prime Minister Tindemans's notion of
flexibility. See Tindemans Report, supra note 9; J.A. Usher, Flexibility and Enhanced
Cooperation, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER AMSTERDAM: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 253,253,256
(Ton Heukels et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER AMSTERDAM].
42 MAASTc-rr TREATY, Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Feb. 7, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 87; MAASTRICHT TREATY,
Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark, Feb. 7, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 89.
41 Presumably the United Kingdom and Denmark would have voted against the monetary
union title had they not been accorded the separate rights stated in the protocols. Thus the Union
was able to move forward on monetary union only if it allowed these states not to be bound.
U MAASTRICHT TREATY, Protocol on Social Policy, 1992 0. J.(C 191) 90.
" MAASTRICHT TREATY, Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member
States of the European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, 1992 O.J. (C 191)91 [hereinafter Agreement on Social Policy].
" In the Social Policy Agreement the eleven signatories committed to work toward
improvement of various aspects of the work environment. MAASTRICHT TREATY, Protocol on
Social Policy, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 90. The Treaty of Rome, which of course is binding on all
member states, contained similar provisions. TREATYOFROME arts. 117-22. The Social Policy
Protocol gave the eleven states the right to use Community institutions and procedures to give
effect to the Social Policy Agreement. MAASTRICHT TREATY, Protocol on Social Policy, 1992
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the monetary union provisions and the social policy provisions clearly
provided that decisions taken within the Council of the Union with respect to
those matters would be taken without the vote of the non-participants.47
m11. FLEXIBILITY AND THE AMSTERDAM TREATY
A. Background
From the time of its negotiation and signing, it was clearly understood by
the member states that the TEU was an incomplete work. The TEU itself
explicitly provided that an IGC be convened to review and reassess the
provisions of the TEU with the aim of improving their effectiveness. One of
the main purposes of the IGC leading up to the AT was to consider potential
reforms of the Union's institutional structure, including the size of the
Commission and increased use of qualified majority voting, in contemplation
of the anticipated significant enlargement of the Union's membership in the
near future.49 The IGC was held over a sixteen month period, culminating with
O.J. (C 191) 90. This led to considerable confusion; it was not clear whether in a given instance
the Commission was acting within the framework of the Treaty of Rome, binding all twelve
members and subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, or under the Social Policy
Agreement. See Catherine Barnard, Flexibility and Social Policy, in CONSTITUTIONALCHANGE,
supra note 8, at 201. The Social Policy Protocol and Agreement were short lived, however.
With the change of government in the United Kingdom from the conservative government of
John Major, which was in power at the time the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated, to the labour
government of Tony Blair, British opposition to the Social Policy Agreement softened. The
1997 AT transferred the provisions of the Social Policy Agreement and Protocol into Title II of
the TEU, the title containing the TEC. Hence these provisions are now binding on all fifteen
member states.
47 Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 45. See EU LAW, supra note 17, at 752; Gaja,
supra note 8, at 856.
4S MAASTRICHT TREATY art. N(2). See generally REVIEWING MAASTRICHT: ISSUES FOR THE
1996 IGC (Alan Dashwood ed., 1996).
41 See Sally Langrish, The Treaty ofAmsterdam: Selected Highlights, 23 EuR. L. REv. 3, 4
(1998); Manin, supra note 11, at 2-3; MICHEL PETITE, TH TREATY OFAMSTERDAM, intro., point
2 (Jean Monet Center, Working Paper, No. 2, 1998) www.jeanmonnetprogramorg/papers/98/98-
2-.html; see generally LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY (David O'Keeffe & Patrick
Twomey eds., 1999) [hereinafter LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY].
Indeed, in December 2002, the fifteen member states agreed to admit ten new members
(Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia) as of May 1, 2004. Copenhagen European Council, Presidency
Conclusions B point 3 (Dec. 13, 2002), available at http://uc.eu.int/newsroom/makeFrame.asp?
MAX=&BID=76&DID=73774&LANG= 1&File=/pressData/cn/cc/73774.pdf&Picture=O.
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the agreement on the text of the AT in June, 1997. The IGC was guided by the
work of a Reflection Group which met during the period leading up to the
IGC5
The Maastricht Treaty employed the principle of flexibility in order to
make progress in two extremely important areas: the monetary union and
social policy. With these results in mind, during the run up to the Amsterdam
IGC, pressure to broaden use of the concept intensified. A majority of the
member states, while accepting the orthodox view that solidarity and
unanimity were necessary for an enlarged Union to survive, pressed for
consideration of a variety of contentious measures, including significant
extension in the use of qualified majority voting and co-decision in the
legislative process, and incorporation of the Schengen acquis on visas and
border checks into the TEU. It was also apparent that the United Kingdom
opposed these measures. The traditional principle of uniformity would have
assured that Britain could thwart adoption of these desired reforms."' Thus,
some member states concluded that success of the IGC depended on the
negotiation of a scheme of flexibility whereby some member states could
proceed with measures, both without the participation of the United Kingdom
and without its ability to veto the effort. A controversial Franco-German
proposal was put forth in September 1994 suggesting that a "hard core" of
member states press ahead with measures to, among other things, strengthen
Union federal democracy, deepen Franco-German integration and expand the
s The IGC formally began in Turin, Italy in March, 1996. See BULL. E.U. 3-1996, at 11.4.
It culminated with agreement on the substance of the draft text of the AT in June, 1997, see
BULL. E.U. 6-1997, at 1.2. In preparation for the IGC, the European Council called for the
formation of the Reflection Group comprised of prominent citizens of the member states. This
Group was to consider the range of issues and to begin to frame the agenda for the IGC. It issued
its report to the Madrid meeting of the European Council held in December, 1995. The
Reflection Group noted that the goal of the IGC should be to focus on revisions of the TEU in
three broad areas: (i) making Europe more relevant to its citizens; (ii) enabling the Union to work
better and preparing it for enlargement; and (iii) giving the Union greater capacity for external
action. Reflection Group's Report, Dec. 5, 1995, http:/europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-
doc/reflect/final.html [hereinafter Reflection Group Report]. At the opening of the IGC at the
March, 1996 meeting of the European Council in Turin, the Reflection Group's agenda was
essentially adopted for the IGC. It was noted that the agreed agenda should center around the
three themes: (i) bringing the Union closer to its citizens; (ii) making the institutions more
efficient and democratic; and (iii) strengthening the Union's external relations capabilities. See
BULL E.U. 3-1996, at 11.3. For a history of the IGC, see Langrish, supra note 49, at 3-4; Manin,
supra note 11, at 2-4; Petite, supra note 49, at Introduction.
s See THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 186-87 (ANDREW DuFF ED.,
1997) [hereinafter AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY].
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Union toward the East. 2 The United Kingdom countered with the view that
the Union should develop in ways acceptable to all member states.53
While the British and the Franco-German approaches clearly clashed, both
did embrace flexibility.' It thus was clear from 1994 that the issue of
flexibility would have to be squarely confronted in the IGC. Virtually all of
the member states accepted the principle of differentiated integration as
necessary, and most accepted the correlative notion that no member state
should have a veto." In the face of this preponderant view, Britain conceded
that other states could be allowed to go forward, but only with Britain's
agreement. 6
The Reflection Group, confronted with very definite views on the issue of
flexibility from most of the member states, recognized that it had to deal
directly with the issue in its Report. The Report acknowledged that both the
Union's success in achieving an ever closer Union, which is clearly set forth
as a goal in the TEU's statement of the Union's purposes,57 and achievement
of the first of the themes set for the IGC, that of making the Union "more
2 Id. at 188; Ehlermann, supra note 9, at 249; Shaw, supra note 8, at 67. This position,
forceful as it is of integration, was evocative of Chancellor Brandt's view of flexibility expressed
20 years earlier.
s AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 51, at 188.
"Prime Minister Major insisted that "the way the Union develops must be acceptable to all
member states, and that no member state should be excluded from an area of policy in which it
wants and is qualified to participate." But he noted that "conformity can never be seen as an
automatic principle." Id. Professor Shaw notes that the British position was designed to afford
maximum flexibility for the United Kingdom while ensuring that it not be left behind, as it would
in the Franco-German model of a "hard core" of member states willing to proceed much further
down the road toward extensive cooperation and integration. Shaw, supra note 8, at 67. In her
view, one of the key differences between the Franco-German and the British positions was that
the emphasis in the British position was on the "discipline of integration," whereas in the Franco
German position the emphasis is on the "freedom" of the participating member states. Shaw,
supra note 8, at 67.
A number of states benefitting from Union subsidies were suspicious of flexibility, as they
felt it would dilute their influence. They also believed, like the United Kingdom, that flexibility
presented the member states with a false choice. Each member state would have to agree to
participate or risk marginalization. Kortenberg, supra note 37, at 844.
s AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 51, at 189-90.
56 Id. This position is essentially the approach followed in the Maastricht Treaty's monetary
union title and protocol, wherein all member states agree that the United Kingdom and Denmark
need not participate.
S7 TEU pmbl., art. 3.
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relevant to its citizens,"58 depended on meeting the demands of its citizens.59
The Report viewed increased availability of flexibility as a demand of the
citizens of the Union.
The Reflection Group's approach to the issue was both cautious and
ambiguous. It attempted to balance the need for solidarity and flexibility, and
it espoused the need for both. The Reflection Group noted that the acquis
communautaire, or common core, developed under Title II of the TEU, must
not bejeopardized. ° It then suggested that flexibility which would enable new
stages of integration to take place should be accommodated, so long as it could
be accomplished without compromise to the acquis as a whole. It also urged
that maintenance of the acquis not be used as a devise to prevent necessary
adjustments from being made to respond to new situations.6' The Report
rather boldly asserted that if an objective could not be met in the normal
fashion, that should not prevent "those who wish and even need to make the
Union progress from doing so subject to clear limits." '62 However, the Report's
articulation of those clear limits showed a much more cautious stance. For
example, in its view, flexibility should be allowed only as a last resort, any
differences in obligation should be only temporary, and member states unable
to participate in a particular measure should be provided assistance in order
that they might develop the requisite capability.63
s See Reflection Group Report, supra note 50, at The 1996 Conference.
Reflection Group Report, supra note 50, 13.
'° Id. 14.
61 Id. 13.
62 Id. 14.
Id. 15. The Report acknowledged that while there was not unanimity among its
members, a large majority agreed that six guiding principles should govern the use of flexibility:
(i) flexibility should be allowed only when it serves the Union's objectives
and when all other solutions have been ruled out;
(ii) differences in obligation should be temporary;
(iii) no member state meeting the necessary conditions should be excluded
from participation in the measure;
(iv) assistance should be provided to member states that are unable to
participate in a cooperation measure to enable them to develop the requisite
capability for participation;
(v) when a cooperation measure necessitates an adjustment in the acquis, a
common basis must be preserved to prevent a retreat from common principles
and objectives;
(vi) the single institutional framework must be respected.
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The European Council, with the Reflection Group's Report in hand, took
a more aggressive position regarding flexibility when it established the final
agenda for the IGC. In its view, cooperation measures need not be taken only
as a last resort, nor need they be only temporary in nature. Rather, a view of
flexibility more along the lines of the "variable geometry" was envisioned."
Despite the extensive, emotionally charged debate over the issue of flexibility
among the member states and the Union institutions during the several years
prior to, and during, the IGC, minimal attention was given to consideration
of these principles during the actual negotiation of the AT text." Understand-
ably, inclusion of flexibility in the treaty is both lauded and decried. 7
The AT embraces the concept of flexibility in a variety of ways by
authorizing specific types of differentiated action. The AT partially follows
the approach of the Maastricht Treaty, but the AT breaks dramatically from the
form and substance of the Maastricht Treaty model in the inclusion of Title VII
of the TEU. Title VII is a set of free standing provisions for closer cooperation
in areas of the Treaties which do not have separate, specific provisions
" The Presidency, reporting on the Turin, Italy meeting of the European Council in March,
1996, stated that the IGC should examine "whether and how to introduce rules either of a general
nature or in specific areas in order to enable a certain number of Member States to develop a
strengthened cooperation, open to all, compatible with Union's objectives, while preserving the
acquis communautaire, avoiding discrimination and distortions of competition and respecting
the single institutional framework." Turin European Council, Presidency Conclusions 2 (Mar.
29,1996), available at http://europa.CV.intlen/record/turin.html [hereinafter European Council's
Position]; see Schrauwen, Flexibility in the Treaty of Nice, in FLExmILITY IN CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 8, at 61.
"5 For a detailed chronology of the positions of the member states and Union institutions, and
their evolution during the period leading up to the negotiation of the text at Amsterdam, see AT:
TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 5 1, at 185-94; Franklin Dehousse, The IGC Process and
Results, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note 49, at 93.
' It is reported that the free standing provisions on flexibility as set forth in the AT were
given a scant seven minutes of discussion on the morning of the final day of the negotiation of
the text of the Treaty in Amsterdam during June 1997. AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note
51, at 195.
17 See WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 163 (referring to flexibility as a new
organizing principle within the Treaties), Professor Weatherill describes the flexibility provisions
as being of"major potential significance." Stephen Weatherill, "II Wanted You to Understand
I Would Have Explained it Better": What Is the Purpose of the Provisions on Closer
Cooperation Introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM
TREATY, supra note 49, at 21 [hereinafter "Ifl wanted You to Understand.. .'I On the other
hand, Philip Allot opines that "[tihe Amsterdam Treaty will mean the co-existence of dozens of
different legal and economic sub-systems ... a sort ofnightmare resurrection of the Holy Roman
Empire.. ." Shaw, supra note 8, at 64.
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allowing for such cooperation. Moreover, many of the AT's provisions on
closer cooperation are included within the text of the AT itself, whereas in the
Maastricht Treaty the authorizations of flexible action were located in
protocol, not text. This shift, however, does not alter the binding character of
the provisions. The flexibility concepts regarding the monetary union and the
provisions of the various social protocols were certainly binding according to
their terms; however, inclusion of closer cooperation provisions in the text of
the AT treaty demonstrates a degree of confidence in or comfort with the
flexibility among the member states that the side agreements do not share.6
The AT contains a variety of forms of authorized closer cooperation, and
these authorizations are spread across all three pillars of the treaty structure.
The AT leaves virtually undisturbed the flexibility concepts regarding the
monetary union as set forth in the first pillar of the Maastricht Treaty through
protocols. On the other hand, the flexibility concepts surrounding the social
chapter, which were built into the third pillar through the Social Protocol and
the Social Agreement," are eliminated. These social provisions, which are
"communitarized" by their restatement in the AT as part of the first pillar,7"
include a substantial part of the Social Protocol's substance.7' The "optout"
flexibility for the United Kingdom and Denmark with respect to these
measures is eliminated. These social provisions are now embedded in the
institutional structure ofthe first pillar. The usual rule, that decisions taken are
binding upon all members, even those which may have voted against the
decision under qualified majority voting, applies; consequently, these
provisions are moved from differentiation into the traditional notion of Union
uniformity.
As previously noted, the AT includes the concept of flexibility or closer
cooperation in each of the three pillars of the treaty architecture. For
simplicity it may be more straightforward to consider the pillars in reverse
order: third, second and first.
" Whether it is comfort with or confidence in the concept, on the one hand, or the use of a
pragmatic device whereby some members could avoid a veto and could press ahead with certain
integration measures, of course, could be debated. Since the reforms contemplated by the AT
were in the form of amendments to the TEU and the TEC, unanimous approval and ratification
of the treaty was required.
" See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
70 AT arts. 136-43.
, Compare AT arts. 117-120, with Social Agreement, supra note 45, arts. 1-7.
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B. Closer Cooperation Within the Third Pillar: Police and Judicial Coopera-
tion in Criminal Matters
Within the third pillar, the AT specifies a set of provisions regarding police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.72 One of the other significant
changes effected by the AT is the transfer of the Union's visa, asylum, and
immigration policies from the third pillar into the first pillar.73 With that
transfer, the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters provisions
which form Title VI of the AT are all that remain of the third pillar. These
criminal cooperation provisions are more specific than their analog in the
Maastricht Treaty.74 Flexibility is drafted into the provisions of Title VI of
the AT both in a modest way and in a very significant way. Essentially, these
provisions authorize the Council, by unanimous vote and on arecommendation
from a member state or the Commission, to: adopt common positions or
framework decisions for approximation of national laws with respect to
matters that would provide a high degree of security to the citizens of the
Union in the fields of police or judicial cooperation in criminal matters and
which combat racism or xenophobia; and to establish conventions dealing with
such matters, the adoption of which the Council will recommend to the
member states.S All actions taken by the Council within this Title are taken
by unanimous vote, and bind all member states, with two minor exceptions.76
Though the terms cooperation and closer cooperation are used in some of
the substantive provisions, the concept of flexibility is incorporated into these
provisions only in one modest way. Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of
Justice to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of
framework decisions, the interpretation of conventions established under this
title and the validity and interpretation of measures implementing such
71 TEU arts. 29-39.
3 See infra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
74 MAASTRIcIrT TREATY arts. K. I-K.9. The Maastricht Treaty's provisions regarding visa,
asylum and immigration policy are included along with cooperation in police andjudicial matters
in these provisions. Articles K. I -K.9 of the AT, before the renumbering of the treaty provisions,
contained the AT's revised visa, asylum and immigration provisions; they have nothing to do
with the police and judicial cooperation matters.
75 AT arts. 29-31, 34.
76 The Council may adopt measures implementing certain decisions taken within Title VI by
qualified majority voting. AT art. 34(2)(c). Measures implementing conventions that have been
agreed to by the Council and recommended to the member states are adopted by a majority of
two thirds of the member states. AT art. 34(2)(d).
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conventions." The Court is also given jurisdiction to rule on disputes between
the member states regarding the interpretation or application of the authorized
measures, and on disputes between the member states and the Commission
regarding the interpretation or application of the relevant conventions.78 An
aspect of flexibility is built into these provisions as they articulate the Court
of Justice's jurisdiction. While the jurisdiction described is conferred on the
Court, the same article states that any member state may accept the Court's
jurisdiction to issue such preliminary rulings.79 Thus, the Court appears not to
have jurisdiction to entertain a request for a preliminary ruling on issues
arising within Title VI from a member state not accepting this jurisdiction.
Also, and more importantly, a judgment of the Court in a request for a
preliminary ruling would not be binding on the member state not accepting
such jurisdiction, nor would such a judgment form part of the acquis
communautaire.80
The significant inclusion of flexibility in Title VI is in a separate article,
Article 40, which authorizes closer cooperation measures with respect to police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. At first reading, this incorpora-
tion of flexibility into Title VI appears to preserve to the member states the
opportunity of initiating action in areas in which Union activity is likely to
- AT art. 35(l).
18 AT art. 35(7).
79 AT art. 35(2).
"0 These provisions of Article 35 of the AT are outside the TEC. Thus the Court's general
jurisdiction and the member states' general obligation to accept a judgement of the Court are
inapplicable. Outside the first pillar, the Court only has such jurisdiction as is expressly
provided in treaty provisions. Article 46 of the TEU, as amended by the AT, states the ambit of
the Court's jurisdiction. The Court, of course, is authorized to exercise its powers with respect
to the TEC. TEU art. 46(a). Outside the TEC, the Court has jurisdiction only with respect to four
specified areas, two of which relate to closer cooperation matters. AT arts. 46(b), 46(c). See
ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 21 (1999); Anthony
Amull, Taming the Beast? The Treaty ofAmsterdam and the Court ofJustice, in LEGAL ISSUES
OFTHE AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note 49, at 109. Within the TEC, the specific jurisdiction
of the Court is set forth in Articles 226-45. Outside the TEC, thejurisdiction is stated in specific
treaty provisions, for example TEU articles 6(2), 35 and 40. These specific jurisdictional grants
are then restated by reference in Article 46.
The acquis communitaire, or the "Community Patrimony," includes the law and policy
which have accumulated over the life of the Community. The acquis includes not just law, the
treaties, secondary legislation and judicial decisions, but the policies and procedures accepted
by the members as governing their activities are also included. See Stephen Weatherill,
Safeguarding the Acquis Communitaire, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER AMSTERDAM, supra
note 41, at 153, 154-57.
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proceed slowly and modestly."' But in reality, promising as this provision
might appear, it solves very little. Through Article 40, member states are
separately authorized to avail themselves of the institutions and procedures of
the Treaties to effect any closer cooperation measure which they desire to
undertake in areas within the subject matter of Title V. 2 The two substantive
restrictions on such cooperation are very easy to satisfy. Any proposed
cooperation must respect the powers of the Community and the objectives of
Title VI, and it must have as its aim the development of the area of freedom,
justice and security more rapidly than might occur via the procedures set forth
in the main portion of the Title. 3 The difficulty with this authorization, and
the reason the provision is ineffective, lies in the procedure required.
Generally, action which the Union might take within Title VI requires
unanimity." Member states desiring to engage in a closer cooperation measure
within Title VI present their request to the Council. The Council is then to
decide by qualified majority whether or not the proposed action can be
undertaken by the requesting members.85 The Commission is entitled to give
its opinion on the matter and the Parliament is to be apprized of the matter.
Parliament's advice, however, is not sought with respect to the matter.86 This
procedure ought to provide significant flexibility and opportunity for member
state initiative. However, if any member state declares that for stated reasons
of national policy it intends to oppose authorization of the measure, no vote
s1 During the IGC, the third pillar was considered as the ideal area for flexibility and closer
cooperation; its use there was thought to provide a model for other Treaty areas. Eric Philippart
& Geoffrey Edwards, The Provisions on Closer Cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam:
Problems of Flexibility in the European Union, 37 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 87, 100 (1999).
2 AT art. 40(l). See generally Ehlermann, supra note 9, at 266.
83 AT art. 40(l)(b).
" AT art. 34(2). This unanimity requirement is only slightly relaxed by the Treaty of Nice.
Under the AT, the Council could approve by qualified majority voting measures required to
implement certain decisions taken within Title VI, other than common positions, framework
decisions or decisions regarding approximation of laws among the member states. AT art.
34(2)(c). The Treaty of Nice merely allows the Council to approve by qualified majority voting
an international agreement dealing with those matters which the AT would have allowed the
Council to act on by qualified majority. TREATY OF NICE art. 1.4 (replacing AT art. 24).
Otherwise, the AT's unanimity requirement within Title VI remains unchanged.
"s AT art. 40(2). Although the qualified majority voting is provided for, the proposal would
in fact likely be adopted unanimously. Only the votes of the member states intending to
participate in the activity are included for purposes of computing the number of votes necessary
for passage. AT art. 44.
"AT arts. 40(2), 44.
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will be taken on the proposal."7 The request would thus fail. The requesting
states can then ask the Council to refer the matter, by a qualified majority vote,
to the European Council. But the European Council in deciding whether the
measure can be implemented must act by a unanimous vote,8 including the
concurrence of the objecting state. Thus, any member state not wishing to
participate can successfully block the measure, just as it could block a
comparable proposal considered under the main portion of Title VI, because
of the unanimous voting requirement.
One noteworthy aspect of the closer cooperation authorized by the AT, both
in Article 40 and elsewhere throughout the AT, is its character. A measure, if
adopted under this provision, is certainly institutional in character. The
decision to go forward is that of the Union institution, the Council, even
though it would bind only the agreeing states. This is a different form of closer
cooperation than that authorized in the social protocols of the Maastricht
Treaty, in which the action agreed upon was taken by the agreeing member
states directly, and not through the Union institutions.89
The institutional character of this cooperation measure is reinforced by the
plenary power conferred on the Court of Justice with respect to any such
measure." There is a curious difference between the conferral ofjurisdiction
with respect to the main workings of Title VI and thejurisdiction conferred on
the Court regarding closer cooperation measures taken under Article 40.
Article 35 specifically articulates the jurisdiction granted to the Court
regarding measures taken under the main portions of Title VI. With regard to
the closer cooperation measures taken pursuant to Article 40, however, the
Court is granted the plenary powers it has under the TEC.9" Thus the Court
would havejurisdiction to determine not only whether the proper procedure set
out in Article 40 was followed, but also whether the substantive criteria for
such cooperation were met. The Court could be asked, for example, to rule on
97 Id.
SId.
s9 This aspect of Article 40, as well as of the other forms of closer cooperation authorized
by the AT, conforms to the Reflection Group's and the European Council's notion that the single
institutional framework of the Community be respected regardless of the pillar under which the
authorizing provisions rest. See Reflection Group Report, supra note 50, 13, 15; European
Council's position, supra note 64.
90 AT art. 40(4).
91 AT art. 40(4) (stating, "[t]he provisions of the Treaty establishing the European
Community concerning the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the
exercise of those powers shall apply...").
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the validity of the measure in light of whether it does in fact respect the powers
of the Community as required by Article 40(10(a)) or whether it meets the
general test of proportionality.92
C. Flexibility Within the Second Pillar
The second pillar of the Treaties as restated by the AT consists of the
provisions in Title V on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (the
CFSP).93 The term 'closer cooperation' does not appear within this Title and
it is argued that no closer cooperation is authorized within this Title. 94 The
CFSP procedures actually embrace both a form of flexibility and uniformity.
Title V charges the Union with defining and implementing a foreign policy,
having as its objective, among other things, safeguarding the values, interests,
independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the Charter of the
I The following example highlights the difference in the Court's jurisdiction to review a
measure passed under the main portion of Title VI from its jurisdiction to review a closer
cooperation measure taken with respect to the same issue. Article 35(5) provides that the Court
has no jurisdiction to review the validity of operational measures carried out by member states'
police agencies or to review member states exercise of their responsibilities regarding the
maintenance of law and order or internal security, when these actions are undertaken pursuant
to the main part of Title VI. The doctrine of proportionality is an integral part of the Court's
general jurisdiction. See TEC art. 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 135-37. Article
40(4) gives the Court plenary jurisdiction regarding cooperation measures undertaken within
Title VI. The Court thus would have jurisdiction to review the proportionality of an internal
security measure taken by some member states as a closer cooperation measure under Article 40,
or to determine whether such measure does in fact respect the powers of the European
Community. Not only is this jurisdictional grant more generous than the grant of jurisdiction
within the main portion of Title VI, it is also more generous than grants of authority in other
parts of the TEU outside the TEC. An example is the jurisdiction regarding subsidiarity. TEC
art. 5. With regard to subsidiarity, the Court'sjurisdiction extends to a determination of whether
the procedural requirements have been met, but not to the substantive or political question of
whether the measure meets the test of subsidiarity. See Case C-233/94, Germany v. European
Parliament and Council, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2405; Opinion ofAdvocate General Leger, 87-90; EU
LAw, supra note 17, at 158-60, 559.
9' AT tit. V arts. 11-28.
" Philippart & Edwards, supra note 81, at 98-100. This argument is supported by the fact
that in the final rounds of negotiations of the AT, specific closer cooperation provisions for the
CFSP, which had been included in drafts of the treaty, were removed. Id. But during the
negotiation of the AT the member states determined that the desired flexibility within the CFSP
could be achieved by "other means," and that the explicit closer cooperation provisions were
unnecessary. The "other means" contained in the AT's provisions on the CFSP was the concept
of constructive abstention discussed in this section. Ehlermann, Differentiation, Flexibility,
supra note 9, at 264-66; Kortenberg, supra note 37, at 853.
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United Nations.95 The European Council is charged with setting out the
principles and general guidelines for this policy, and the Council of Ministers
of the Union is charged with taking the decisions necessary to define and
implement this common foreign policy in the context of the guidelines
developed by the European Council. " To this end, the Council is authorized
to adopt joint actions,9" which are Union foreign policy positions or policies,
and common actions,9 which are positions agreed upon by the member states
but which are to be implemented by them at the national level.
The decision making procedure within the CFSP is bifurcated. Some
measures are to be decided by unanimity, and others by qualified majority
voting. Agreement within the Council on some joint actions or common
foreign policy positions requires unanimous approval." However, if the
measure for consideration entails a joint action or common position that is
based on a common strategy previously adopted by the European Council, or
if it is a measure implementing a previously agreed upon joint action or
common position, the decision is taken by qualified majority voting."0
With respect to the first category of decisions (those not based on a prior
decision), a member state can abstain from voting. An abstention is said not
to count as a vote, and thus, does not destroy unanimity."' If the abstaining
state makes a formal declaration, it is under no obligation to comply with or
implement the measure,"2 although it acknowledges that the action agreed
upon by the Council is an act of the Union. This "constructive abstention"
rule introduces a moderate form of flexibility. The action agreed upon is an
action of less than all of the member states, and the abstaining and declaring
9' AT art. 11(1).
9 AT art. 13.
9' AT art. 14.
98 AT art. 15.
9 AT art. 23(I).
"o AT art. 23(2). The reason for the different voting procedures probably is that in the latter
category, a prior decision has been taken by unanimity. With that overarching unanimous
agreement, there is less need that further decisions also be taken by unanimity.
1 1 AT art. 23(1). This is consistent with the Treaties' usual rule on the effect of abstentions.
Generally speaking, an abstention does not count as a vote; thus an abstention does not break
unanimity. TEC art. 205(3). The difference within CFSP is the consequence of the abstention.
' 2 AT art. 23(1). An abstaining state not making such a formal declaration is apparently
bound by the agreed upon measure.
103 The full extent of an abstaining and declaring member state's responsibility is that while
not obliged to apply the decision, it "shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit
of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict
with or impede Union action based on that decision... ." Id.
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state need not participate in it. Thus, solidarity is broken since less than all the
members are participating.'" Although the abstaining state is not bound by the
action, it does acknowledge that the act taken is that of the Union; and more
importantly, from the perspective of flexibility, it agrees that it will not take a
position inconsistent with the agreed upon position and will not act to
undermine that position.' The introduction of this moderate flexibility is a
change from the CFSP procedures contained in the Maastricht Treaty. Under
the Maastricht scheme, all CFSP decisions required unanimity. The Treaty did
not provide for abstention and its consequences.'06
With respect to the second category of decisions (the qualified majority
voting decisions, taken on the basis of a previously adopted joint action or
common position on the basis of a common strategy previously adopted by the
European Council), unanimity, at least in the negative sense, is enforced.
Although a decision on such a matter would be made by qualified majority
voting, if a member state, for important and stated reasons of national policy,
declares that it intends to oppose the adoption of such a measure, no vote shall
be taken. The matter may then be referred to the European Council for
decision by unanimity.'0° Thus, with respect to this category of decisions,
either the measure is adopted by the unanimous decision of the European
Council, or a situation like the Luxembourg Compromise exists, in which no
vote is taken. The latter results in a negative form of uniformity, as nothing is
done by any of the member states.
The flexibility introduced into the CFSP by the AT is similar to the closer
cooperation in criminal matters authorized by Title VI of the AT, in that the
decisions are taken by a Union institution, the Council, and not by the member
'o See FLExmuxrr iN CoNsTrrJTIoNS, supra note 8, at 61, 67; "Iff Wanted You to
Understand... ", supra note 67, at 22.
105 Id.
'0 MAASTRICHT TREATY art. J.8(2). Under the Maastricht scheme, the general voting rules
would have applied. An abstention would not block a unanimous vote, but the abstaining party
would be bound by the decision. Thus, it might have been more likely to have thwarted the
measure by voting against it. Regarding the CFSP provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and the
AT, see Commentary: Foreign Policy or Trompe l'oeil, in AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra
note 51, at 124; Daniel T. Murphy, The European Union's Common Foreign and Security
Policy: It is Not Far From Maastricht to Amsterdam, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 871 (1998);
John J. Kavanagh, Note, Attempting to Run Before Learning to Walk: Problems of the EU's
Common Foreign and Security Policy, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 353 (1997).
"o' AT art. 23(2). This voting rule of Article 23(2) is said to be in derogation of the unanimity
rule of Article 23(1). This portion of the CFSP's decision making process mirrors that
applicable in Article 40. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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states directly. This flexibility differs from that authorized in Title VI in that
the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction with respect to Title V and the CFSP.
D. Closer Cooperation and Flexibility Within the First Pillar
1. The Visa, Asylum and Immigration Policies
The AT's most significant introductions of flexibility and closer coopera-
tion can be found in the first pillar, especially in the new visa, asylum and
immigration policies, and most prominently in the free standing provisions on
closer cooperation. The visa, asylum and immigration policies, together with
the provisions on cooperation in criminal matters, comprised the third pillar of
the Maastricht Treaty."~ The AT transfers the visa, asylum and immigration
policies into the Community institutional framework of the first pillar as Title
IV of the TEC.' 9 In a related change, the Schengen acquis is incorporated into
the first pillar."'
The AT's visa, asylum and immigration policies provide that over time, the
territory of the Union membership should become an area of freedom, security
and justice."' To accomplish this the Council is charged with adoption of
certain measures within five years from the effective date of the Treaty. These
measures will, among other things, ensure the free movement of persons within
the territory of the Union, and deal with external border controls, asylum,
immigration measures and measures designed to prevent and control crime." 2
In several subsequent provisions, this charge is made more specific. The
Council, within the stated five year period, is to adopt measures: providing for
the elimination of internal border controls (national border controls) as to any
person, Union citizen or other person, and rules governing visas; "' measures
regarding immigration policies including conditions of entry and residence,
procedures for issuing visas, illegal immigration and repatriation of illegal
101 MAASTRICHT TREATY arts. K. I -K.9.
'0' TEC tit. IV, arts. 61-69.
IO Protocol Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the Framework of the European Union,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 93 [hereinafter The Schengen Protocol].
11' TEC art. 61.
112 TEC art. 61(a). Since by its terms the AT is effective as of I May, 1999, the measures
referred to in this article should be adopted by the Council not later than the end of April, 2004.
Id. 11 TEC art. 61(1)-(2).
[Vol. 31:265
2003] AMSTERDAM OR NICE 291
immigrants;. 4 and measures regarding asylum, including standards for
qualification as a refugee, procedures for granting refugee status and
procedures for determining which member state is responsible for considering
an application for asylum from a particular person.'15
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the provisions dealing with immigration and
asylum matters came within the intergovernmental portions of the Union
architecture (the third pillar), and the commitments with respect to them were
vaguely stated. Maastricht authorized the Council, at the initiative of the
Commission or a member state, to adopt by unanimity joint positions with
respect to the matters covered by Title IV." 6 Not only does the AT set forth
much more precise obligations with respect to these matters, but as a
consequence of their transfer into the first pillar, as Title IV of the TEC Treaty,
these provisions are now within the purview of the European Court of
Justice.' 1
7
114 TEC art. 63(3)-(4).
I' TEC, 63(1)-(2).
"6 See, e.g., MAASTRiCHT TREATY art. K.2. This section is the predecessor of TEC article
62. Throughout the Maastricht Treaty, the initiative was with the member states or perhaps the
Commission. Title IV of the TEC, as amended by the AT, much more specifically directs the
Council to adopt measures with respect to border control, visa, immigration and asylum policies
by May, 2004.
The plenary jurisdiction of the Court is circumscribed only in that a review of measures
relating to the maintenance of internal security is prohibited. TEC art. 68(2). See generally KAY
HAaBRONNER, IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW AND PolicY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 35-123
(2000) [hereinafter IMMiGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW].
Title IV itself does not contain any reference to the Schengen Agreement. The Schengen
Agreement was an extra-Union agreement in which the thirteen signatories (the fifteen member
states less the United Kingdom and Ireland) agreed to take measures designed, among other
things, to eliminate internal border controls. The Agreement is in part a product of some
member states frustration at the Union's inability to agree on measures to open the internal
borders. It is an example of common action taken by member states outside the Union, and it
is proffered as an example of the consequence of not building the possibility of flexible action
into the Treaties. The Schengen Agreement, with its provisions regarding elimination of internal
border controls, certainly relates to areas at the core of the Community, the freedom of
movement of goods and persons in particular. The "communitarization" of the Schengen
Agreement in the Schengen Protocol removes the anomaly caused by the existence of these very
Community-centered provisions outside the Community's legal order. The Schengen Protocol
is an example of closer cooperation and flexibility. By its terms, the Schengen Agreement
authorizes its 13 signatories to establish closer cooperation among themselves on matters within
the scope of the Schengen Agreement, and to use the institutions and legal framework of the
Union to effect that cooperation. Schengen Protocol, supra note 110, at art. I. See Kortenberg,
supra note 37, at 835, 844. See generally EU LAW, supra note 17, at 660-63; IMMIGRATION AND
ASYLUM LAW, supra note 117, at 54-56, 70-73.
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Under the Maastricht Treaty the position of United Kingdom and Ireland,
which have a separate open border relationship and agreement, with respect to
common border crossing and other immigration policies was secure. So long
as these issues remained within the third pillar, decisions with respect to them
required unanimity." ' Thus, either the United Kingdom or Ireland could
thwart any measures unacceptable to them. The AT does provide that
decisions with respect to some of the matters covered by Title TV are to by
taken unanimously, at least for the first five years." 9 However, certain
In the Schengen Protocol, the thirteen signatories of the Schengen Agreement agreed that
the Schengen acquis would be binding on them and that the Council of the Union, acting by
unanimity among the 13, would determine the legal basis (within the provisions of the Treaties)
for each provision and decision constituting the Schengen acquis. The parties further agreed that
the Schengen acquis was to be regarded as based on Title IV of the TEC. Schengen Protocol,
supra note 110, at art. 2(1). Thus the 13 Schengen participants agreed that past and future
decisions or procedures implementing the Schengen Agreement came within Title IV of the
TEC. The importance of any distinction between the regularly adopted TEC Title IV measures
and Schengen-attributed Title IV measures is blunted by the agreement of the 13 participants
in the Schengen Protocol that the Court of Justice shall exercise its general jurisdiction with
respect to actions implementing the commitments of the Schengen Protocol. Schengen Protocol,
supra note l10, art. 2(l).
The Council, as directed by article 2(1) of the Schengen Protocol, has attributed all of the
Schengen acquis to various legal bases within Community law. Council Decision of 20 May
1999 concerning the definition of the Schengen acquis for the purpose of determining, in
conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community and
the Treaty on European Union, the legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions which
constitute the acquis, 1999 0.1. (L 176) 1. Whether or not the measures agreed to within the
Schengen acquis are reviewable after this attribution remains unclear. By one view, these
measures, after this attribution, are transformed into secondary Community legislation, like
regulations and directives; their compatibility with various treaty provisions is therefore subject
to review by the Court of Justice in the same manner as regulations and directives. Kortenberg,
supra note 37, at 843. It is also argued that the Schengen Protocol as a protocol to the AT is an
element of primary Community law, like the treaty provisions themselves, and that the Council
in making the attribution was essentially incorporating the measures taken within the Schengen
acquis into the Protocol itself. Thus, these measures have a status comparable to the various
treaty provisions, and the Court's jurisdiction does not extend to reviewing various treaty
provisions for compatibility with one another. See IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, supra note
117, at 72. Measures adopted within Title IV would clearly be part of the Community's
secondary legislation. It seems anomalous that Schengen acquis measures attributed by the
Council should have a higher standing than subsequent measures adopted by regulation or
directive under Title IV that treated the same issues as Schengen-attributed measures.
1S MAASTRICHT TREATY art. K.4(3).
19 TEC art. 67(1). At the end of five years, the Council, acting unanimously, will determine
what portion of the issues covered by Title IV would be decided by qualified majority voting.
TEC art. 67(2). Obviously, the United Kingdom or Ireland could, by voting against such
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measures regarding issuance of visas were to be decided by qualified majority
voting from the effective dates of the AT, or five years thereafter." 0
The working of Title IV of the TEC is similar in form to the monetary
union provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in that it applies formally to all
member states. Moreover, since it is within the first pillar, it is within the
institutional, rather than the intergovernmental, framework. Consequently, the
United Kingdom and Ireland could preserve their separate and different
policies regarding immigration and visa matters only by a separate set of
understandings. Again, on the model of Maastricht's monetary union
structure, all of the member states agreed in two Protocols' to grant the
United Kingdom and Ireland separate rights regarding the subject matter of
Title IV. But unlike the monetary union provisions of the Maastricht Treaty,
express reference is made in the text of Title IV to the Protocols. 2 By the
terms of the Protocol on Application, the United Kingdom and Ireland are
permitted to exercise such controls as they deem appropriate regarding entry
of all persons into their territories, and the separate understanding between the
United Kingdom and Ireland regarding movement of persons between their
territories is acknowledged. 2 Applying the principle of reciprocity, the other
member states reserve the right to exercise such controls as they deem
appropriate to persons seeking entry into their territories from the United
Kingdom or Ireland. 4
The Protocol on Position establishes the procedures for implementation of
Title IV without participation of the United Kingdom or Ireland. Like the
monetary union provisions, the United Kingdom and Ireland are not entitled
to participate in the Council's adoption of measures implementing Title IV.
Furthermore, such measures as are adopted by the other members are not
binding upon the United Kingdom or Ireland." 5 This.difference is reinforced
by a provision that Title IV decisions shall not "affect the acquis
communautaire nor form a part of Community law as they apply to the United
proposals, thwart the transfer of any Title IV decisions into the qualified majority voting scheme.
120 TEC art. 67(3)-(4).
', Protocol on Application of Certain Aspects of Article 7a of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community to the United Kingdom and to Ireland, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 97 [hereinafter
Protocol on Application], and Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 99 [hereinafter Protocol on Position].
', TEC art. 69.
'" Protocol on Application, supra note 121, at arts. 1-2.
4 Id. at art. 3.
u" Protocol on Position, supra note 121, at arts. 1-2.
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Kingdom or Ireland."' 26 Thus, solidarity within the Union and its policies is
broken and the United Kingdom and Ireland are free to have policies (visa,
asylum, etc.) different from the common position of the other members.
Correspondingly, the others are free to have separate policies regarding
persons seeking to enter their territories from the United Kingdom or Ireland.
Not only is a difference in practice authorized, but the Protocol on Position
acknowledges that a different regime of law exists for the United Kingdom and
Ireland than that which exists for the other member states as among them-
selves.
The United Kingdom and Ireland are each given the opportunity to "opt in"
to any proposed measure considered under Title IV. They are each afforded
the right, within three months of the presentation of any proposed measure to
the Council, of notifying the Presidency that it desires to participate in the
adoption of such measure and is prepared to implement it upon its adoption.' 27
The Unions's initiative in the sphere of visa, asylum, and immigration is
thrice fractured. Twelve member states are bound by the provision of Title IV,
the United Kingdom and Ireland have separate obligations and procedures, and
Denmark has its own different set of obligations. Denmark was granted rights
regarding visa and immigration matters substantially similar to those of the
United Kingdom and Ireland.2 2 Again, all of the member states agreed by
protocol that measures taken under Title IV do not apply to Denmark, and do
not constitute part of the acquis communitaire with respect to it.' 29 Denmark
is not given an "opt in" right as is afforded the United Kingdom and Ireland.
Instead it is given an opportunity to decide within 6 months of its adoption
whether it will implement a measure adopted with Title IV which "build[s]
upon the Schengen acquis."'3  If it determines to implement such a measure,
the obligation between Denmark and the other participating member states is
not one of Union law, but rather is an obligation of international law.'
'2 Id. at art. 2.
'27 Id. at art. 3. If either state so notifies the Presidency, the rules regarding voting on the
measure are revised to include its votes in the computation of the votes necessary for adoption.
Id.
128 See Protocol on the Position of Denmark, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 101, art. 4.
'" See id. art. 2. Denmark is a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, and, under the
Schengen Protocol, it agrees to accept and apply the Schengen acquis which has Union legal
status attributed to it. See supra note 117.
ISo See Protocol on the Position of Denmark, 1997 O.J. (C 340), art. 5.
131 See id.
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The degree of differentiation authorized by this Protocol exceeds that
allowed to the United Kingdom and Ireland. Apparently Denmark will decide
whether or not a Title IV measure builds on the Schengen acquis. If it decides
that it does, then it is free to adopt a comparable national measure.'32 In
adopting a national measure, it is not participating in the Union measure; its
measure separately exists as an obligation grounded in principles of interna-
tional law, and so does not contribute to the acquis communautaire. Finally,
there is no reciprocity provision; there is no agreement that the member states
participating in a particular Title IV measure will extend it to Denmark in
exchange for the international law commitment which Denmark would make
to them.
2. Free Standing Closer Cooperation Provisions
The AT's major innovation regarding flexibility is the free standing or
enabling closer cooperation provisions contained as Title VII of the TEU,'33
which are included in the "common provisions" of the Treaty. The "common
provisions" are not thought to be within any of the three pillars, as they treat
matters which are not specific to any of the pillars. 34 Since the closer
cooperation provisions are not tied to any subject matter, it is appropriate that
they be contained within these "common provisions." The broad, flexible
powers contained in Title VII are, however, severely qualified by a provision
placed by the AT in the first pillar.'35 The placement of these closer coopera-
tion provisions is thus bifurcated, some are within the common provisions of
the TEU as Title VII (Articles 43-45), and another is within the first pillar as
Article 11 of the TEC. However, Article 11 of the TEC does not only apply
to closer cooperation within the first pillar. Despite its placement within the
TEC, its effect is coextensive with the provisions of Title VII of the TEU' 36
The essence of the closer cooperation provisions is set out within Title VII
in Article 43.37 The other two articles of Title VII are not so significant.
132 See id.
133 AT tit. VII, arts. 43-45.
134 See Shaw, Challenges of Flexibility, supra note 8, at 69-70.
... TEC art. 11.
136 See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
AT art. 43 (The Consolidated Version of this Article in the TEU reads as follows:
1. Member states which intend to establish closer cooperation between
themselves may make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid
down by this Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European Community
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Article 44 sets forth the manner by which the number of votes necessary for
passage of closer cooperation measures are to be determined and the financing
of such measures."' Article 45 obliges the Council of Ministers and the
Commission to inform the Parliament of the closer cooperation activities
undertaken within Title VII. 39
Article 43 assumes that the member states have the right to engage in closer
cooperation; it does not confer this right on them. Rather, it merely notes that
the member states intending to establish such closer cooperation "may make
use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down in this
Treaty.. .,"" so long as the eight conditions set out are met. This language
acknowledges the reality that cooperation among the member states can take
place outside the Union context. 4 ' The Schengen Agreement was a particu-
larly visible example of this alternative to closer cooperation measures taken
within the Union. It was an agreement among less than all of the Union
members dealing with issues of articulated Union concern, but it was outside
provided that the cooperation:
(a) is aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and at protecting and
serving its interests;
(b) respects the principles of the said Treaties and the single institutional
framework of the Union;
(c) is only used as a last resort, where the objectives of the said Treaties
could not be attained by applying the relevant procedures laid down therein;
(d) concerns at least a majority of the Member States;
(e) does not affect the acquis communautaire and the measures adopted
under the other provisions of the said Treaties;
(f) does not affect the competences, rights, obligations and interests of the
Member States which do not participate therein;
(g) is open to all Member States and allows them to become parties to the
cooperation at any time, provided that they comply with the basic decision
and with the decisions taken within that framework;
(h) complies with the specific additional criteria laid down in Article 11 of
the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 40 of this
Treaty, depending on the area concerned, and is authorised by the Council in
accordance with the procedures laid down therein.
2. Member states shall apply, as far as they are concerned, the acts and
decisions adopted for the implementation of the cooperation in which they
participate. Member States not participating in such cooperation shall not
impede the implementation thereof by the participating Member States).
13 AT art. 44.
119 AT art. 45.
140 AT art. 45.
141 See Philippart & Edwards, supra note 81, at 90.
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the Union. 42 Article 43 would minimize the need to resort to extra Union
agreements by inviting the member states to use the institutions and procedures
of the Union to facilitate operation and governance of agreements between the
Member States so long as the eight qualifications are met.
Article 43 also seems to be intergovernmental in character. It invites
member states to use Union institutions and procedures to effect cooperation.
There is no language comparable to that in Article 40(2) of the AT to the effect
that the cooperation is to be effected through the Council.4 3 The member
states participating in the activity under Article 43 mutually agree to imple-
ment the proposed measure, and the non-participating states agree not to
impede its implementation." Moreover, the non-participating states can
participate in the discussion of the measure within the Council, but they do not
vote on its adoption.
145
The freedom of the member states to engage in bilateral or multilateral
relationships in areas outside the objectives of the Treaties is not open to
doubt.'" However, Article 43 does not speak to these matters. Its focus is on
the use of Treaty-based institutions for collaborative action within the areas of
Union concern. Measures undertaken within the ambit of Title VII must be
"aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union . . .and serving its
interests";" but at the same time such measures must not affect the acquis. 48
Such measures must also be of concern to "at least a majority of the Member
States.' 49 The language of Article 43, together with its placement in the
"common provisions" of the Treaties, creates the inference that closer
cooperation can be undertaken pursuant to it with respect to any issue of
concern to the Union.
The first of Article 43's substantive restrictions reinforces this point.
Article 43(1)(a) provides that the cooperation undertaken under it must further
the aims of the Union and serve its interests. Thus, it seems that cooperation
1 2 See supra note 117.
'14 Article 44 does provide, however, that for purposes of the adoption of measures necessary
to implement closer cooperation decisions taken under Article 43, the relevant institutional
provisions of the TEU and the TEC shall apply.
144 AT art. 43(2).
14' AT art. 44(1). This is an advance from the provision in the Maastricht Treaty which
precluded non-participants from the discussion as well at the voting. See supra note 125 and
accompanying text.
" See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
147 AT art. 43(l)(a).
14 See AT art. 43(1)(e).
149 AT art. 43(l)(d).
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can be undertaken under Article 43 with respect to any matter furthering the
Union's interest unless there is a prohibition on such cooperation elsewhere in
the Treaties or unless there are specific treaty provisions governing coopera-
tion in that area.150
Moreover, Article 43(l)(a) provides that closer cooperation undertaken
pursuant to Article 43 must further the interests of the Union, not the
Community. Thus, cooperation across the full range of the TEU appears to be
contemplated, not just cooperation in fields encompassed by the TEC. For
example, no closer cooperation provision is contained in TEU Title V, the
CFSP, but there is nothing in the language of Article 43 precluding use of
Community institutions, for closer cooperation in that area.
One of the most important qualification on the cooperation which can be
undertaken within Title VII is Article 43's requirement that such measures can
be taken only as a last resort, when the objectives of the Treaties cannot be
attained through the usual Union procedures.' 5' It seems, then, that member
states, recognizing that there may be objections by others to a given initiative,
for example to certain worker benefits such as leave as leave of absence or
insurance, could not resort to Title VII before first attempting to have measures
adopted in the usual course, and presumably having failed to garner the
requisite votes. 52
Article 43 qualifies both the substance and the procedures of Title VII
closer cooperation action by making a reference to Article I I of the TEC. It
notes that the cooperation undertaken within Title VII must comply with the
criteria set forth in TEC Article 11, and it sanctions only such closer
cooperation as is authorized by the Council acting pursuant to that section. 1
53
's An example is cooperation in the area of police orjudicial cooperation in criminal matters,
which is explicitly regulated by AT Title VI.
1' AT art. 43(I)(c).
152 It is true that the language of Article 43(1) does not authorize Title VII closer cooperation
action only after the members have tried and failed to adopt the measure in the normal course.
But it seems that some effort to pass the measure under the normal procedures must be
undertaken and it must be clear that such an effort will fail. Otherwise, it cannot be demon-
strated that the objectives of the Treaties "could not be attained.... ." Id. (emphasis added). To
read the section otherwise would allow it to be utilized in hypothetical and speculative cases.
Moreover, such premature use would undermine the Union's usual decision making procedures.
Closer cooperation is thought to be a "regime of exception rather than the norm." Philippart &
Edwards, supra note 81, at 90. The Last Resort concept was one of the Reflection Group's
suggested guidelines. See Reflection Group Report, supra note 50, 15; See Philippart &
Edwards, supra note 81, at 93.
'1 See AT art. 43(1)(h). This provision also qualifies any closer cooperation to be
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On one level, Article 11 does lay down substantive rules and procedures for
closer cooperation in areas of Community concern. The Article is contained
within the TEC and the substantive qualifications to closer cooperation for the
most part relate to the Community, not the Union.'54 However, the incorpora-
tion of Article 11 into AT Article 43 extends its application to all closer
cooperation sanctioned by Article 43. "5 In turn, all closer cooperation within
the TEC sanctioned by Article 11 is also qualified by AT Article 43. "6 Article
11 narrows the ambit of any possible closer cooperation, radically increases
the role of the Union institutions, and makes passage of any such measure
dubious.
Article 11 significantly affects the possibility of engaging in closer
cooperation under Title VII in two respects. It adds its own substantive
constraints to such action, and it sets forth the decision making process to be
used for such measures. Article 11 imposes five constraints on cooperation
undertaken regarding police and judicial cooperation in criminal matter by restricting them to
measures complying with AT Article 40. Thus, all closer cooperation measures undertaken
within the ambit of Title VII of the AT are separately restricted by either TEC Article 11 or AT
Article 40.
1s4 TEC Article I 1(1) reads as follows:
[m]ember States which intend to establish closer co-operation between
themselves may be authorized, subject to Articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty on
European Union, to make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms
laid down by this Treaty, provided that the cooperation proposed:
(a) does not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of
the Community,
(b) does not affect Community policies, actions or programmes;
(c) does not concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between
nationals of Member States;
(d) remains within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community
by this Treaty,
(e) does not constitute a discrimination or a restriction of trade between
Member States and does not distort the conditions of competition between the
latter.
TEC art. I 1(1).
155 AT art. 43(l)(h) (providing that Member States are authorized to use the institutions,
procedures and mechanisms of the TEU and the TEC, provided that such cooperation "complies
with the specific additional criteria laid down in Article II of the Treaty establishing the
European Community and Article 40 of this Treaty, depending on the area concerned, and is
authorised by the Council in accordance with the procedures laid down therein").
156 TEC art. 1 l(l) states that member states intending to engage in closer cooperation may
be authorized "subject to Article 43 and 44 of the Treaty on European Union..." to make use
of Community institutions, procedures, etc.
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activity, in addition to the eight stated in Article 43.s7 Some of the Article 11
constraints may not in and of themselves impose significant additional hurdles,
but some are inconsistent with the requirements of Article 43. Cumulatively,
these thirteen substantive constraints virtually doom any closer cooperation
measures.
Closer cooperation in areas falling within the Community's exclusive
competence is prohibited." 8 Compliance with this requirement is difficult
since the concept of exclusive competence is itself unclear and there is no
straightforward delineation of the areas of the Community's exclusive
competence." 9 However, assuming that a proposed closer cooperation
measure does fall within the Union's exclusive competence, like a proposed
agreement among some of the members to alter agricultural subsidies, this
prohibition in Article 11 probably does not broaden the ambit of proscribed
closer cooperation action. The concept of exclusive Community competence
means, at least, that the member states are prohibited from taking inconsistent
action in areas covered by the Treaties after the Community has acted in those
areas. " There is no reason that some of the member states collectively should
be allowed to do something under the notion of flexibility or closer coopera-
tion which individually none of them are free to do. Closer cooperation in any
matter coming close to the exclusive zone would likely already be prohibited
by AT Article 43(1)(e)'s caution that any closer cooperation not affect the
acquis or measures adopted under other provisions of the Treaties.
Article 11 requires that any closer cooperation not affect Community
policies or programs, not concern Union citizenship, not discriminate between
nationals of member states or constitute a discrimination or restriction of trade
"s7 See AT art. 43; TEC art. 11(1), supra note 137.
s TEC art. Ill(1)(a).
s See supra note 30; PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 117-18, 124-28 (1998); Marise Cremona, External Relations and External
Competence: The Emergence ofan Integrated Policy, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 137, 152-
66 (Paul Craig& Griinnede Btrcaeds., 1999); Toth,A LegalAnalysis of Subsidiarity, in LEGAL
ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 24, at 37, 39-41.
"o The ERTA case, Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C. R. 263, 276, indicates
much more broadly that the existence of community power in an area, as conferred by the
Treaties, excludes the possibility of concurrent member state action. See Weatherill, Beyond
Preemption?, supra note 24, at 13-14. Cf. Josephine Steiner, Subsidiarity Under the Maastricht
Treaty, in LEGAL ISSUES OFTHE MAASTRICHTTREATY, supra note 24, at 49,57-58 (arguing more
conservatively that exclusivity is only triggered after the Community has acted in an area, and
that exclusivity only precludes member state action that is inconsistent with Community action).
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among the member states.' Arguably these strictures do not raise the
threshold of prohibited conduct beyond that prohibited by Article 43's
requirement that closer cooperation further the objectives of the Union, respect
the principles of the Treaties and not affect the acquis.6 " However, it is
difficult to conceive of areas of potential closer cooperation within the
Community sphere that do not affect Community policies and the acquis.13
At the same time, any such cooperation must remain within the limits of the
powers conferred on the Community by the TEC.'1 Winnowing through these
qualifications, it becomes difficult to imagine a measure that does not affect
Community policies'65 or the acquis, " but at the same time remains within the
limits of the power conferred on the Community by the TEC.
Article 11 of the TEC dramatically institutionalizes permitted cooperation.
Article 43 of the AT appears to grant the member states the right to initiate and
agree upon a closer cooperation measure. The institutional involvement is
almost incidental; voting on the measure is done by qualified majority voting
within the Council. Article 11 alters the intergovernmental nature of the
cooperation and reduces the role of the member states. Within Title VII of the
AT, the Commission is assigned virtually no role. However, under Article 11
of the TEC, a member state desiring to pursue a cooperation initiative must
161 TEC art. I l(1)(b), (c), (e).
162 AT art. 43(l)(a)-(c).
163 The acquis includes Community policies. See supra note 80. These prohibitions on
cooperation measures affecting Community policies and the acquis are much more restrictive
than the forms of flexibility suggested by the Reflection Group at the time of the IGC. The
Reflection Group noted that flexibility should be allowed if it did not compromise the acquis as
a whole. See Reflection Group Report, supra note 50,113, 14. Some suggested areas in which
cooperation might be possible include culture, tourism, youth, education and professional
training, taxation and movement of capital. See Plilippart & Edwards, supra note 81, at 96; see
also Shaw, Challenges of Flexibility, supra note 8, at 74. Professor Weatherill notes generally
that closer cooperation is more likely in areas not "hemmed in" by a substantial body of
Community law, as these are the areas less likely to be affected by Community policies. Stephen
Weatherill, Finding Space for Closer Cooperation in the Field of Culture, in CoNsTrrUTIONAL
CHANGE, supra note 8, at 237, 243. But he argues that culture is "hemmed in" by various
contiguous Community policy areas and thus is not a likely candidate for closer cooperation.
Id. at 244-53. He concludes that, in fact, the ambit of permissible closer cooperation is so
narrow that very little cooperation is allowable. It is difficult to find areas that are not "hemmed
in" or affected to extant Community policies and activity. Id. at 253-57; see also Philippart &
Edwards, supra note 81, at 96.
1- TEC art. I l(l)(d).
165 TEC art. I I(b).
166 AT art. 43(l)(c).
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notify the Commission. The Commission then is authorized to submit a
proposal to the Council with respect to the matter.167  However, it is not
obliged to bring forward a proposal. 6  If it does not, its only further
responsibility is to advise the requesting member state of its reasons for not
doing so." As under Article 43 of the AT, Article 11 of the TEC provides
that the Council must vote to approve the measure by qualified majority. But
the Council must have before it a proposal from the Commission. 7 Closer
cooperation procedures under Article 11 follow the Commission's ususal
prerogative of initiative. Through this refinement of the proposal procedure,
closer cooperation decisions have become institutionalized such that the
member states have no right of initiative, and the distinction between these
decisions and regular Community action is decidedly blurred.
The comparable provisions in Title VI of the AT regarding police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, while similar to Article 11 of the TEC
in some respects, are also strikingly different, and less institutional in
character. Under Article 40 of the AT, a member state may put forth to the
Council a proposal for cooperation. The Council will vote on the measure by
qualified majority after giving the Commission the opportunity to present its
views and after advising the Parliament.' The Commission has no right of
initiative. The Commission's role, with respect to a request of a member state
after the cooperation measure is agreed upon, likewise differs between Article
11 of the TEC and Article 40 of the AT."'
Article 11 is contained within the TEC, and thus, the first pillar of the
Union's architecture. Consequently, it is subject to the general jurisdiction of
167 TEC art. 11(2).
16 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
AT art. 40(2).
' Under Article 11, the Commission apparently has the prerogative of deciding whether a
state not initially participating in the closer cooperation measure can participate at a later time,
and can determine the terms of such participation. A state desiring to become a party to a
cooperation measure is to notify both the Council and the Commission of its intention. The
Commission is given three months within which to give an opinion on the request, and then it
is given an additional four months to decide on the request and its terms. TEC art. 11(3). In
contrast, a member state desiring to participate in an agreed upon cooperation measure in the
area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is to notify the Council and the
Commission. The Commission is given three months to make a recommendation regarding that
participation, including any specific arrangements. Then the Council is to decide within four
months on the member state's request. AT art. 40(3).
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the Court of Justice.'73 Title VII of the AT, including Article 43, is contained
within the TEU's "common provisions." Title VII does not contain any
reference to jurisdiction of the Court. However, the AT in its "Final Provi-
sions" augments the Maastricht Treaty's provision which stated the Treaty
areas that were subject to the Court's jurisdiction. Article L of the Maastricht
Treaty was amended by Article 46 of the AT to extend the Court's jurisdiction
to both Title VI and Title VII of the AT. 74 However, both Titles are not
subject to the same jurisdiction. Article 46(c) provides that the Court's
jurisdiction is extended to Title VII under the conditions provided for in TEC
Article 11. Since Article 11 is part of the first pillar, which is subject to the
Court's plenary jurisdiction, it is fair to conclude that Title VII is subject to the
same plenary jurisdiction. Thus, both direct actions and preliminary reference
cases are possible, as is substantive review of closer cooperation decisions.
However, Article 43 does not contain any form of an "opt in" provision like
Article 35 does for Title VI. The Court's preliminary reference jurisdiction
regarding police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is limited by AT
Article 35 to member states specifically accepting that jurisdiction.'75 Insofar
as Article 46(b) extends the Court's jurisdiction into the closer cooperation
provisions of the police and judicial cooperation areas of Title VI, it does so
"under the conditions provided for by Article 35.'' 76 Thus, it appears that
while closer cooperation undertaken with the general authorization of Article
43 of the AT and Article 11 of the TEC is subject to the Court's plenary
jurisdiction, closer cooperation undertaken within Title VI is subject to the
Court's direct jurisdiction. The Court's preliminary reference jurisdiction in
such closer cooperation matters is limited to questions from those member
states explicitly accepting the Court's jurisdiction.
Within Article 11, the voting rules are significantly modified from the usual
Community procedures. They are, however, comparable to those applicable
for cooperation within the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters as stated in Title VI of the AT and to certain of those applicable within
the CFSP. The vote within the Council on the proposed cooperation measure
is by qualified majority.'" However, if a member state declares within the
Council that for stated reasons of national policy it intends to oppose the grant
"n AT art. 46(a); see supra note 80.
174 AT art. 46(b), (c).
175 AT art. 35(2), (3).
1-6 AT art. 46(b).
, TEC art. 11(2).
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of authority for cooperation, a vote shall not be taken on the matter.' 8 Thus,
any member state can thwart a proposed cooperation measure. Additionally,
non-participating states agree not to impede its implementation if it is
adopted.' This provision in Article 11 allows for differentiation in action and
obligation. Some member states would be allowed to engage in certain
activities which others oppose, or at least in which they choose not to
participate. Yet Article 43 is entirely modified by Article 11, and the nod to
differentiation afforded by Article 43 is undercut by Article 11. Article 11
imposes uniformity and solidarity, at least of a negative type, inasmuch as an
objecting member state can prevent an action from being undertaken.
It appears that the authorization of general or free standing closer
cooperation, measured under Article 43 of the AT and Article 11 of the TEC,
is elusive at best. It is difficult to conjure up instances in which such
cooperation would be both authorized and then withstand scrutiny of the Court.
Assuming that a measure were approved by the Council, that is that the
measure was adopted under qualified majority voting and that no state
exercised its right to block a vote, the question of whether the measure would
pass review by the Court is problematic. The substantive restrictions on closer
cooperation contained in AT Article 43 and TEC Article 11 are cumulative.
Individually, some of them are not significant hurdles, but others seem
insurmountable. In order to be effective under Article 43, the closer coopera-
tion measure must be taken only as a "last resort." ' Even more problematic
are the almost mutually exclusive requirements in Article 11 that the measure
not affect Community policies and the acquis, etc., and that it simultaneously
be within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community."'8 Finally,
as required by Article 11, the measure must not discriminate between nationals
of member states."2
178 Id.
'- AT art. 43(2).
'so AT art. 43(c).
181 TEC art. 1 l(b), (d).
"' The whole point of closer cooperation is to allow some member states to engage in
activities in which other states are unable or are unwilling to participate. To the extent that a
closer cooperation measure contains provisions applicable to the citizens of the participating
states, it almost inevitably discriminates against the citizens of the non-participating states in
which a different rule or level of benefit would apply.
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IV. ENHANCED COOPERATION WITHIN THE NICE TREATY
The AT specifically provided that an IGC be held to decide upon further
amendments to the Treaties which would be necessary in anticipation of the
next enlargement." 3 Many of these same difficult issues were to have been
dealt with during the negotiation of the AT but were not then resolved.18 The
issues initially set for consideration at the IGC leading to the Treaty of Nice
were the "Amsterdam leftovers": the revision of the size and composition of
the Commission, a change in the weighting of Member State votes for
qualified voting purposes, and the extension of the use of qualified majority
voting.'85 The IGC, which culminated in agreement on the text of the Treaty
of Nice in December 2000, was formally convened in February 2000,"86 and
closer cooperation was not initially listed as a subject for further review during
the IGC.
A number of facets of closer cooperation, as structured in the AT, make it
an unclear, uneven and unworkable scheme. The substantive requirements
vary considerably from the very modest requirement within Title VI that closer
I" Protocol on the Institutions with the Prospect of Enlargement of the European Union,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 111. It was believed that negotiations could be concluded by the end of 2002
with as many as ten nations, principally in eastern Europe. These states could formallyjoin the
Union in 2004 at the time of the next election of the Parliament. Laeken European Council
Presidency, Conclusions, BULL E.U. 12-2001, at 10-1l; Enlargement, BULL E.U. 11-2001, at
77; Editorial, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1309 (2001). Indeed, at the Copenhagen Summit,
December, 2002 it was announced that negotiations had been completed with ten countries and
that they would become member states on May 1, 2004. The ten are: Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovia.
Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December, 2002, BULL E.U.
12-2002, at 13.3.
" See Reflection Group Report, supra note 50, 9, 81-84, 99-106, 113-18; Lamberto Dini,
Forward, in AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 5 I, at xxvii; Langrish, supra note 49, at
18.
1S5 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, BULL E.U. 12-1999, at 9.
"'The opening meeting took place on February 14, 2000. BULL E.U. 12-2000, at 9. For a
discussion of the background of the Nice IGC and the chronology of the negotiations, see
generally BRITISH MANAGEMENT DATA FOUNDATION, THE TREATY OF NICE IN PERSPECTIVE
(200 1); Kieran St. C Bradley, Institutional Design in the Treaty of Nice, 38 COMMON. MKT. L.
REV. 1095; Markus G. Puder, Salade Nicoise from Amsterdam Lefi-Overs: Does the Treaty of
Nice Contain the Institutional Recipe to Ready the European Union for Enlargement?, 8
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 53 (2002); XENAPHON A. YATAGANAS, THE TREATY OF NICE: THE SHARING
OF POWER AND THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION-A CONTINENTAL
PERSPECTIVE (Jean Monet Center, Working PaperNo. 1,2001)http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.
org/papers/01/0 1010 .htm
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cooperation further the aims of the Union, 87 to the cumulative, inconsistent
and seemingly insurmountable requirements of AT Article 43 and TEC Article
11.88 The Commission's role in the cooperation decision-making processes
varies from none, in the opt-out scheme of the visas, asylum and immigration
provisions within AT Articles 61-68,89 to the right to give its opinion before
a decision is taken in the police and judicial cooperation matters of Title VI, 9
to control of the initiative as provided in AT Article 43 and TEC Article 11. 91
Non-participating states in the visas, asylum and immigration policy areas of
the AT (the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) cannot block a measure
which the others decide to undertake. Likewise, a non-participating and
disagreeing member cannot block the flexibility afforded by the constructive
abstention provisions of CFSP within the second pillar.'92 Yet, within the
police and judicial cooperation area of Title VI and the free-standing closer
cooperation provisions of AT Article 43 and TEC Article 11, a non-participant
can prevent the Council from voting on a measure, thereby completely
blocking it. For these, and no doubt other reasons, no use has been made of the
AT's closer cooperation provisions.193
Because of the failure to utilize the AT's closer cooperation provisions, the
decision of the European Council during its meeting in June, 2000 in Fiera,
Portugal to add a review of closer cooperation to the agenda of the IGC was
probably not a difficult one, and it was supported by the Commission and
187 AT art. 40.
8 See supra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
'39 In the main portions of the visas, asylum and immigration sections, the Council makes
decisions unanimously, upon a proposal from the Commission or a member state. TEC art. 67.
'9 AT art. 40(2); see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
Presidency, Report to the Fiera European Council, June 14,2000, CONFER 4750/00, at http:l
db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/04750en.pdf [hereinafter Presidency Report]. Hereinafter
Prepatory documents of the IGC will be cited to their CONFER number]. The Union's Webcite,
Europa, contains webpage titled, GeneralInformation: Conduct ofthelGC, http://europa.eu.int/
cornmVarchives/igc2000/geninfo/index-en.htm [hereinafter General lnformation: Conduct ofthe
IGC]. This document gives the chronology of the preparatory meetings and refers to preparatory
documents by CONFER number; and it contains a link to each of the referenced documents.
The Bulletin of the European Union from the signing of the AT in 1997 through early
2002 does not record the adoption or consideration anycloser cooperation measures. In contrast,
the flexibility built into the opt out provisions of the visas, asylum and immigration policies and
the constructive veto within CFSP have allowed significant differentiated activity to take place
in those spheres.
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many member states.'9 At the direction of the 2000 Presidency of the Council,
Portugal for the first half of the year and France for the second, 95 a series of
discussions were held with respect to closer cooperation.'" The European
Council in June, 2000 agreed that closer cooperation was to be added to the
agenda for the IGC'9 but ambivalence toward the concept remained obvious.
The issues regarding closer cooperation were framed so that the principle was
viewed from several perspectives. The European Council noted that closer
cooperation must be reviewed "while respecting the need for coherence and
solidarity in an enlarged Union."'"" Yet it was acknowledged that a reform of
closer cooperation, which made it more useful, might decrease the temptation
to resort to action outside the Union. ' " Discussion also emphasized the
importance of viewing closer cooperation as a means of integration, not
segregation, among the member states." Implementation of closer coopera
'" See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
Presidency Report, supra note 193; Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of
the Member States, Commission Opinion in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on
European Union on the Calling of a Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States to Amend the Treaties, Feb. 1, 2000, CONFER 470 1/00,at http://db.consilium.
eu.int/cigdocs/EN/04701 en.pdf [hereinafter Opinion on Convening of the IGC]; Conference of
the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Letter from Gunter Pleuger,
Representative of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to Francisco Seixas da
Costa, Chair of the Intergovernmental Conference Group ofMinisters Representatives, Mar. 30,
2000, CONFER 4733/00, at http://db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/04733en.pdf.
"I Portugal held the Presidency for the first half of 2000, with France holding the office for
the second half of the year.
19 See General Information: Conduct of the IGC, supra note 193.
1 See Feira European Council, BuLL E.U. 6-2000, at 9; Conference of the Representatives
of the Governments of the Member States, Presidency, Note to the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of
the Intergovernmental Conference, July 5, 2000, CONFER 4755/00, at http://db.consilium.eu.
int/cigdocs/EN/14755en.pdf [hereinafter Note to Ministerial Meeting]; Yatagamas, supra note
186. Mr. Yatagamas notes that closer cooperation was first discussed at an informal meeting of
the IGC representatives in mid-April, 2000, and that initial opposition to inclusion of closer
cooperation on the agenda from the smaller states softened, allowing it to be added to the IGC
agenda at the Fiera Summit.
In Intergovernmental Conference, BULL E.U. 6-2000, at 41.
i See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Note
to Ministerial Meeting, supra note 197; Opinion on Convening of the IGC, supra note 194, at
41. The Schengen Agreement is cited in both documents as the example of multilateral action
by member states taken outside the Union, with the implication that such arrangements were not
helpful to the Union. Id.
I00 See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
Presidency Note to IGC Ministerial Conclave, Oct. 5, 2000, CONFER 4780/00, at http://db.
consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/478063en.pdf. This focus on integration is the crux of the change
2003] 307
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
tion was considered, both from the perspective of its substantive requirements
and its procedures, and from the perspective of its breadth of application.
Concerns about the breadth of application largely centered on the issue of
extending application of cooperation to CFSP and on the question of whether
the procedures for cooperation should differ from sector to sector'o as they do
in the AT.
On the basis of the discussions regarding closer cooperation held at the
ministerial meetings within the IGC from July through October, 2000, the
Presidency put forth a draft of provisions regarding closer cooperation to be
included within the Treaty of Nice.2 These provisions were refined at LGC
ministerial meetings held at the end of October and November, and a revised
draft of the provisions was circulated toward the end of November.2 3 On the
eve of the Nice Summit, the Presidency put forth a complete draft of the Treaty
of Nice, including the cooperation provisions. ' The cooperation provisions
were amended somewhat during the Nice Summit sessions,2"5 and the final text
of the Treaty of Nice was agreed to at the conclusion of the Summit on
December 10. ' The text underwent linguistic, legal and technical revision
during the winter of 2000-2001 and the treaty was signed by the member states
on February 26, 2001 27
of the term in the English version of the Treaty of Nice from "closer cooperation" to "enhanced
cooperation." Closer cooperation can be said to connote a scheme of horizontal activity among
some member states while others do not participate. Enhanced cooperation emphasizes an
additional or deeper level of cooperation among some member states, thereby intensifying the
integration among the participants. The French version of the Treaty of Nice, however, employs
the same term, les cooperations renforcees, as is used in the AT.
' See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
Presidency Note, Aug. 30, 2000, CONFER 4766/000, at http://db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/
EN/04766en.pdf.
Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Presidency
Note, Oct. 18,2000, CONFER 4786/000, at http://db.consiliumeu.intleigdocs/EN/4786en.pdf.
203 See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
Presidential Note to ICG Ministerial Conclave, Nov. 17, 2000, CONFER 4803/00, at http://db.
consiliumeu.intlcigdocs/EN/4803en.pdf.
204 See Conferences des Represetants des Gouvernements des Etats Membres, Project de
Traite deNice, Dec. 6,2000, CONFER 4816/00, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc2000/
genifo/confer4816_-fi.pdf [hereinafter Project de Traite de Nice].
2 Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Revised
Summary: Intergovernmental Conference, Nov. 23, 2000; CONFER 4810/00 [hereinafter
Revised Summary].
0 See General Information: Conduct of the IGC, supra note 193, at Progress so Far.
"7 See generally THE TREATY OFNICE IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 186; Bradley, supra note
186, at 1095; Yataganas, supra note 186.
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The Treaty of Nice makes no change to the flexibility introduced into the
Treaties by the AT's "opt out" provisions for the monetary union or the visa,
asylum, and immigration policies within Title IV of the TEU. However, it
contains substantive and procedural changes to the closer cooperation
provisions within the remaining portions of the Treaties. Structurally, the
flexibility provisions in the text approved at Nice consist of a set of general
provisions, Clauses A through F, which was to apply generally to enhanced
cooperation throughout the Treaties. 8 In the text of the Treaty of Nice, as
signed in February, 2001, these general principles are contained in a Revised
Article 43 to the TEU.2°' Next, separate clauses were included governing
enhanced cooperation within the various sectors of the Treaties. Clauses G
and H, which are included in a Revised Article 11 to the TEC, apply to
enhanced cooperation within Community areas;21° Clauses I thorough M,
which are included in the second pillar as new Articles 27a through 27e of the
TEU, authorize cooperation within CFSP;' Clauses N through P, which are
included as revised and new Articles 40 through 40b of the TEU, treat
enhanced cooperation in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters.
Provisions were added to the CFSP mechanism which authorize enhanced
cooperation measures in that sector of the TEU 2  Several of the member
states and institutions had argued in favor of adding this flexibility.1 3 Indeed,
the AT sets forth an indirect form of flexibility in this sector. Under the AT's
structure of CFSP, the member states voting by qualified majority within the
Council could authorize a joint action or the taking of a common position
based on a common strategy adopted by the European Council and could
authorize measures implementing either a joint action or common position.2"4
An objecting state could indicate its intention to oppose the measure for
reasons of national policy; if any state did so, a vote would not be taken on the
measure.
215
213 See Project de Traite de Nice, supra note 204.
209 See TREATY OF NICE art. 1, § 11.
210 See TREATY OF NICE art. 1, § 6(2).
211 See TREATY OFNICE art. 1, § 9.
212 TREATY OF NICE art. 6 (adding arts. 27(a)-27(e) to the TEU); see generally Schrauwen,
supra note 64, at 67-69.
213 See supra note 194.
214 AT art, 23(2); see supra notes 100, 107 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 100, 107 and accompanying text.
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The enhanced cooperation mechanism within the Treaty of Nice blunts that
effective veto, but only to a limited extent. Member states are authorized to
engage in enhanced cooperation regarding the implementation of ajoint action
or a common position, so long as the implementing measure does not have
military or defense implications. 16 Enhanced cooperation, however, does not
apply to the question of whether or not the Union should take a common
position or adopt a joint action. The AT's rule that a vote not be taken if a
member state objects to its adoption would still allow a member state to block
a vote on that question. Of course, without agreement on a common position
or a joint action, there is nothing that might be implemented by an enhanced
cooperation measure.
The possibility of enhanced cooperation measures in areas having military
and defense implications was included in the draft text put forth by the
Presidency. Indeed, that draft would have authorized enhanced cooperation for
the implementation of a joint action or common position, as the agreed text
does, but also with respect to the taking of "initiatives in the field of security
and defense contributing to the acquisition of crisis management
capabilities. '217 This latter provision was removed at the insistence of the
United Kingdom. The issue of cooperation in security or defense areas
provided deep disagreement during the final negotiations at the Nice Summit.
Germany and France argued in favor of development by the Union of a
military force independent ofNATO, a proposition which the United Kingdom
vigorously opposed.218
The substantive constraints on enhanced cooperation within the CFSP do
not appear significant. The proposed action must respect: (i) the principles,
guidelines and consistency of the common foreign and security policy; (ii) the
powers of the Community; and (iii) the consistency between all Union policies
and its external actions.2 9 However, authorization of any enhanced coopera-
tion measure must also comply with the substantive constraints imposed by the
216 TREATY OF NICE art. 6 (adding New Article 27(b) to the TEU); see Bradley, supra note
186, at 1116; Yataganas, supra note 186, at pt. B, 1 6.
217 Revised Summary, supra note 205.
21 Within the IGC, the member states were divided on the issue of whether was appropriate
to sanction cooperation in defense or security matters. Conference of the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States, Note to IGC Ministerial Conclave, Nov. 17, 2000,
CONFER 4803/00, at http://db.cous./iumcu.intlcigdocs/EN/4803en.pdf. In the end, the
Presidency endorsed such cooperation and included a provision for it. Yatagana, supra note
186, 6.
219 TREATY OF NICE art. 6 (adding Article 27(a) to the TEU).
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Revised Articles 43-45 of the TEU. Decisions on implementation of a
common position or a joint action can be taken by the Council via qualified
majority voting upon the request of a member state.22' The request is
forwarded to the Commission and Parliament. The Commission is to give its
opinion on, among other things, whether the proposed action is consistent with
Union policies." The request is forwarded to Parliament apparently only to
inform it of the matter.
Enhanced cooperation policies and procedures within Title VI, the police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters provisions of the third pillar, and
the free standing cooperation provisions within Title VII are made more
consistent and less stringent, and thus perhaps more useful, than their
counterparts within the AT and TEC. This consistency results in a more
realistic and perhaps achievable set of substantive criteria, unlike the
inconsistent and daunting provisions of AT Article 43 and TEU Article 11. On
the other hand, this consistency entails less procedural flexibility and more
institutional involvement in some instances.
The Commission's procedural right of initiative under old TEC Article 11
was limited to the free standing closer cooperation provision of Title VII. The
Treaty of Nice extends that right of initiative, in a modified form, into the
enhanced cooperation procedures for police and judicial cooperation within
Title VI. Under the AT, closer cooperation within Title VI was to be agreed
upon by the Council, by qualified majority voting upon a request of a member
state, after the Commission gave its opinion.'m The Treaty of Nice requires
that member states desiring to engage in enhanced cooperation in this sphere
address a request to the Commission, which in turn may submit a proposal to
the Council. If the Commission determines not to bring forth a proposal, it
must notify the requesting states of its reasoning. The requesting states then
may submit the request directly to the Council." If a proposal is put forth by
the Commission, the Council proceeds to vote using qualified majority voting.
If the proposal is submitted directly by the member states, the Council still
votes using qualified majority voting, but only if the request comes from at
least 8 member states, and only after consulting Parliament." The slightly
Id. (adding Article 27c). See infra notes 229-36 and accompanying text.
211 TREATY OF NICE art. 6 (adding New Article 27(c) to the TEU).
222 Id.
223 AT an. 40(2).
24 TREATY OF NICE art. 9 (adding Article 40a(l) to the TEU).
m TREATY OF NICE art. 9 (adding Article 40a(2) to the TEU). At present such a request
would have to come from a majority of the member states, 8 out of 15. But after the 2004
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different procedure regarding consideration of a proposal coming directly from
the members, apparently without the consent of the Commission, does not add
much, as any enhanced cooperation measure must involve at least eight
member states" 6 and Parliament need only be consulted.
The objectives of proposed enhanced cooperation measure within Title VI
must remain as stated in the AT; the measure must enable the Union to develop
more rapidly into an area of freedom, security and justice.227 However, the
substantive criteria for enhanced cooperation set forth in New Article 43 also
apply to cooperation within Title VI. Under the AT, closer cooperation in
these criminal matters is not constrained by the requirements of Article 43.
As previously noted, enhanced cooperation within the various pillars is
harmonized under the Treaty of Nice. The substantive criteria of New Article
43 are incorporated into the sphere specific provisions for the CFSP, the police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and Community activities.229 The
Treaty of Nice places all of these substantive criteria in one section, new
Article 43. The cumulative substantive criteria of AT Article 43 and TEC
Article 11 are consequently replaced.
Thus, the provisions of New Title VII (New Articles 43 through 45) apply
throughout the Treaties, and the provisions of New Article 11 apply only to
Community based enhanced cooperation undertaken within the context of the
TEC. The AT joined the provisions of AT article 43 and TEC Article 11 and
made them generally applicable throughout the Treaties unless specifically
displaced."
The Treaty of Nice contains ten substantive criteria that must be met before
any enhanced cooperation measure can be undertaken."3 In the main these
enlargement the request could come from as few as about one third of the members, 8 out of 25.
The implication is that a request of less than 8 will simply not be brought forward for a vote. Id.
" Among the substantive requirements in the general provisions is a rule that any request
for consideration of an enhanced cooperation measure must come from at least eight member
states. TREATY OF NICE art. 11 (adding New Article 43 to the TEU); see infra note 234 and
accompanying text.
-2 TREATY OF NICE art. 9 (adding New Article 40 to the TEU).
2n TREATY OF NICE art. 9 (adding New Article 40a(2)).
2" TREATY OF NICE arts. 6, 9, 2.1 (New Articles 27a(2), and 40a(2) to the TEU).
See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
"' The Treaty of Nice, New Article 43, reads as follows:
[m]ember States which intend to establish enhanced cooperation between
themselves may make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid
down by this Treaty and by the Treaty establishing the European Community
provided that the proposed cooperation:
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criteria do not impose a high threshold and they are internally consistent. The
inconsistences between AT Article 43 and TEC Article are removed.2
Likewise, the seemingly unsurmountable requirements that any cooperation
measure not discriminate among nationals of member states or affect
Community policies or programs233 are not carried over. It is necessary that
the proposed measure not undermine the internal market and that it involve at
least eight member states.234
New Article 43 does not contain the procedures whereby a proposed
enhanced cooperation is to be adopted. Instead, those procedures are
contained in the sphere of specific provisions. Article 43 does, however,
(a) is aimed a furthering the objectives of the Union and of the Community,
at protecting and serving their interests and at reinforcing their process of
integration;
(b) respects the said Treaties and the single institutional framework of the
Union;
(c) respect the acquis communautaire and the measures adopted under the
other provisions of the said Treaties;
(d) remains within the limits of the powers of the Union or of the
Community and does not concern the areas which fall within the exclusive
competence of theCommunity;
(e) does not undermine the internal market as defined in Article 14(2) of
the Treaty establishing the European Community, or the economic and social
cohesion established in accordance with Title XVII of that Treaty;
() does not constitute a barrier or discriminate in trade between the
member States and does not distort competition between them;
(g) involves a minimum of eight Member States;
(h) respects the competences, rights and obligations of those Member
States which do not participate therein:
(i) does not affect the provisions of the Protocol integrating the Schengen
acquis into the framework of the European Union;
() is open to all the Member States, in accordance with Article 43b.
232 For example, the dual and inconsistent requirements that the intended cooperation further
the interests of the Union, AT art. 43(l)(a), but at the same time not affect the policies of the
Union, TEC art. 1 (b), are removed.
23 TEC art. I1 (b)-(c). See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. The AT's
requirement that closer cooperation measures not affect the acquis, AT art. 43(e), is replaced by
a significantly less onerous requirement that the enhanced cooperation measure respect the
acquis. TREATY OF NICE New art. 43(c).
234 TREATY OF NICE art. 11 (adding New Article 43(e)-(g) to the TEU). The minimum
number ofparticipating member states is currently the same under both treaties. The AT requires
the participation of a majority of member states (eight out of fifteen). In contemplation of
expansion, the Treaty of Nice changes the requirement from a majority to a fixed number, eight.
TREATY OF NICE art. I I (adding New Article 43(g)). After the expansion to 25 members, the
Treaty of Nice's participation requirement drops to just over 30 percent.
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impose the "last resort" requirement on all enhanced cooperation proposals.
New Article 43 applies by cross reference to enhanced cooperation within the
CFSP, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and Community
activities. The notion of "last resort" is somewhat clarified from its old form.
As provided in New Article 43, enhanced cooperation may be taken only as a
last resort when the Council establishes "that the objectives of such coopera-
tion cannot be obtained within a reasonable period by applying the relevant
provisions of the Treaties." 5 This language adds two elements. First, it must
appear that the matter cannot be accomplished "in a reasonable time," not that
it absolutely cannot be accomplished. Second, the Council must determine that
the measure cannot be accomplished under the usual procedures before
authorizing a enhanced cooperation measure."6
Once established, participation in an enhanced cooperation measure is open
to all member states. 7 However, as under the AT, the procedures for deciding
upon a member state's request to join in a previously agreed upon enhanced
cooperation measure vary among the different pillars of the Union. Within the
CFSP and the police and judicial cooperation areas, the request to j oin is made
to the Commission and the Council. The Commission is to give an opinion,
but the Council decides on the request."s A request for later participation in
an enhanced cooperation measure undertaken within the TEC is again made
to the Council and the Commission, but it is the Commission that decides upon
the request.239
'3 TREATY OF NICE art. 1.12 (New Article 43(a) to the TEU).
236 This allows the Council to make ajudgment that the objectives cannot be accomplished
under the normal procedures. Presumably thisjudgment can be made prospectively, based on
a reasonable assessment of the prospect for approval of a measure proposed under the normal
procedures.
237 TREATY OF NICE art. 1.12 (New Article 43(b) to the TEU).
23 TREATY OF NICE art. 1.6 (New Article 27(e) to the TEU); TREATY OF NICE art. 1.9 (New
Article 40b to the TEU).
139 TREATY OF NICE art. 2.1 (New Article 1 a to the TEU). This may be an unintended
reference, and it maybe that the Council should be substituted for Commission in this provision.
Such a change would make the process consistent with that applicable in the CFSP and police
and judicial cooperation areas. Moreover the language of the section reads better if the
substitution were made. New Article I la provides that the Commission, after receiving notice
of the request has three months to render an opinion on it. Then "[w]ithin four months of the
dates of that notification [the notification of request from the requesting state] the Commission
shall take a decision on it ... ." TREATY OF NICE art. I Ia (emphasis added). The comparable
provision for the other sectors reads that "the Council shall take a decision on the request within
four months...." TREATY OFNICE arts. 27e, 40b (emphasis added). It seems odd that a decision
regarding the inclusion of additional member states into the enhanced cooperation measure
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Under the Treaty ofNice, decisions on all enhanced cooperation matters are
taken by the Council under qualified voting majority. The effective national
veto contained in old Article 11(2) is eliminated. Arguably, this is one of the
most important revisions made to the closer cooperation procedures by the
Treaty of Nice. Allowing decisions to be taken by the qualified majority,
rather than allowing one of the 15, and soon 25, member states to block the
effort, might make resort to the procedures more likely and more effective.
However, a member state concerned about the proposed cooperation measure
is not left completely without recourse. A state choosing not to participate is
not bound by the measure; indeed, the measure can only be directly applicable
within the participating states.'
With respect to cooperation within the areas of police and judicial
cooperation and the Community polices, an objecting member state has an
additional recourse. It can request that the matter be referred to the European
Council."" However, the procedures for the next steps after referral are
should be given to the Commission, when the all of the other decisions are taken by the Council.
However, old TEC Article 11(3) gives the Commission the prerogative of making this decision
even though a comparable decision within the police and judicial cooperation area is to be made
by the Council. AT art. 40(3). This inconsistency under the AT is said to have "the look of a
compromise cobbled together ... with insufficient attention to detail." WYATT & DASHWOOD,
supra note 1, at 167-68. However, the draft clauses presented by the Presidency read in
substance like the agreed upon text. The decision with respect to later participation in a
enhanced cooperation measure within the Community sphere is to be made by the Commission
(Clause H) while the comparable decisions within CFSP and the police and judicial cooperation
are made by the Council (Clauses M and P). See Revised Summary, supra note 205.
240 TREATY OFNICE art. 1.13 (New Article 44(2) to the TEU. Neither the Treaty of Nice nor
the analogous provision in the AT clearly state which states are bound by the agreed upon
cooperation measure). TREATY OFNICE art. 1.1 3 (New Article 44 (1) provides that all member
states shall have the right to participate in the discussion of a cooperation measure; but only
those states participating in the decision are entitled to vote on the measure. The same right
exists in the AT). AT art. 44(1). For qualified voting purposes, the proportions of the vote are
to be recalculated according as provided in Article 205(2) of the TEC. The question of a state
voting against the measure is not addressed. Of course the issue is clear with respect to a state
determined not to participate. Its votes are not included, and it is not bound. But the status of
a state, which though opposed on the merits participates in the voting, perhaps in an attempt at
defeating the measure under qualified majority, is not stated. Article 44(2) of states that the
cooperation measure is binding only on the states participating in it. TREATY OF NICE art. 1. 13
(New Article 44(2)). Does this refer to the states participating in the voting, or the states voting
in the affirmative and thus willing to participate in the discharge of the measure? Surely the
latter is the intent, but the effect of the measure on a state which loses in the qualified majority
voting is not clear. The usual rule is that the measure, if adopted, is an act of the Union, and all
states, including those which lost in the voting, are bound by it.
241 TREATYOFNICE arts. 1.9 (New Article 40a(2) to the TEU), 2.1 (New Article 11(2) to the
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vaguely stated. The relevant provisions simply state that after the matter has
been raised within the European Council, the Council of Ministers may act on
the proposal according to the procedures which would have applied absent
such referral.242 The referral request option at the very least slows down the
procedure243 and gives the objecting member state another forum to express its
concerns. In all likelihood, however, these are the only consequences of the
referral. The provision does not delineate the European Council's role with
respect to the referral. Clearly it must consider the matter; the relevant
provisions clearly require that much. They state that "after the matter has been
raised before the European Council, the Council ..."24 may act on the
measure. The provisions do not state that the European Council must reach a
decision on the referral. They merely state that the Council can proceed to act
after the matter has be raised within the European Council.245
That the European Council's responsibility is merely to consider the matter
is supported by contrasting these provisions with other treaty provisions. AT
Article 40 contained a similar provision with respect to cooperation decisions
in the police and judicial cooperation areas. If a member state objected to a
proposed measure for stated reasons of national policy, a vote within the
Council would not be taken. The Council could, upon a qualified majority
vote, request that the matter be referred to the European Council, a procedure
virtually the same as that set forth in the first portion of the relevant provisions
of the Treaty of Nice. But after the referral the matter was to be decided by the
European Council acting by unanimity.2' If in the final negotiations of the
TEU).
242 Id.
" Bradley, supra note 186, at 1116. The procedure has been referred to as an "emergency
brake" or a "worn brake pad".
244 TREATY OF NICE arts. 1.9 (New Article 40a(2) to the TEU), 2.1 (New Article 11(2) to the
TEU).
24 The decision making process within the European Council remains unclear. See generally,
EU LAW, supra note 17, at 94-99; D. Wyatt & A. Dashwood, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 20-
22 (3d ed. 1992). The authors note that the European Council does not deliberate formally or
take votes, its role being a political one. Id. at 21.
244 AT art. 40(2). Article 11 of the TEC contained a provision analogous to, but quite
different from, this aspect of New Article 11(2), and to AT Article 40(2). As structured in
Article 1 of the TEC, an objecting state can block the taking of a vote on a cooperation
measure. If it does so the Council, acting on the basis of a qualified majority, may refer the
matter to the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government. That
body may determine that the measure should be adopted, but only if it does so unanimously,
presumably including the vote of the objecting state. The body referred to in this provision is
not the European Council, but is a meeting of the Council of Ministers at which the Heads of
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Treaty of Nice the member states wished to confer that decision making
procedure on the European Council in the relevant provisions of the Treaty of
Nice they could have readily done so.
Under the Treaty of Nice the role of the Court of Justice in cooperation
matters remains unchanged. New Article 4647 extends the jurisdiction of the
Court to the provisions of Title VI, the police and judicial cooperation area,
under the conditions of AT Article 35, and to the general provisions of Title
VII under the terms of New Articles 11 and 1 la, as well as New TEU Article
40. There is no jurisdiction with respect to enhanced cooperation within the
CFSP, or to any aspect of the CFSP. Similarly, under the AT, the Court had
no jurisdiction over the substance of CFSP decisions. Also, the qualification
on preliminary references within the police and judicial cooperation area
contained in AT Article 35 is carried forward in the Treaty of Nice.24 Thus,
the Court continues to have jurisdiction to review adopted enhanced coopera-
tion measures against both the substantive criteria and stated procedures.
The refinement of the "last resort" concept in New Article 43a is of
assistance in this respect. Arguably, inclusion of the notion that it must be
"established within the Council ...," that the object of the enhanced
cooperation cannot be attained through the usual process, transforms the vague
"last resort" concept into a procedural requirement. Although the text does not
so provide, the Court could conclude that its role regarding the "last resort"
requirement is to determine whether Council has in fact established that the
objective of the measure cannot be achieved under the usual processes rather
than involving itself in an assessment of what constitutes a "last resort" and
whether the measure in question is allowable in view of that vague concept.
The Parliament's role in the enhanced cooperation process has been
upgraded in one significant respect. Its general role of being informed of
cooperation measures, and perhaps being consulted with respect to them,
remains unchanged. This more modest role is carried over into cooperation
within the CFSP, where the Council is to forward any proposal to the
Parliament. 50 Within the police and judicial cooperation area and the
Community area, the Council proceeds to consider the measure after
State or Government are present. Usually this would be a summit meeting of the Council of
Ministers, held at least once during each presidency. The European Council would be comprised
of this same group plus the president of the Commission. See EU LAW, supra note 17, at 97.
241 TREATY OF NICE art. 1. 15 (New Article 46 to the TEU).
240 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
249 TREAT OF NICE art. 1.12 (New Article 43a to the TEU).
2s0 TREATY OF NICE art. 1.6 (New Article 27c to the TEU).
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consulting Parliament.25" ' Presumably this means that the Council must simply
consult Parliament, but is not obliged to follow its advice. With respect to
cooperation within Community matters, however, Parliament is assigned a
more significant role. If the measure under consideration is in an area covered
by the co-decision procedures, the assent of Parliament is required in order for
the measure to be effective.
V. CONCLUSION
The Treaty of Nice substantially changes the AT's cooperation procedures
in at least three respects; the substantive qualifications are made less onerous
and are more harmonized, the national veto is eliminated, and the role of the
Commission is made more prominent. The first and second of these changes
ought to result in a greater likelihood that the system of flexibility will be used.
The last change, the increased role of the Commission, adds a separate
dimension to the cooperation process, the effect of which is unknown.
Enhanced cooperation throughout most of the Treaties, and many areas of
authority (the CFSP being the exception) are now within the control of the
Commission.253 A proposal for a cooperation measure must be presented to the
Council by the Commission in much the same manner as in the Community's
normal law making process. Thus, the cooperation procedure is completely
institutionalized. Any reform introduced into the Treaties by the member
states as a means whereby they could accomplish certain goals among
themselves despite the unwillingness or inability of other members to
211 TREATY OF NICE arts. 1.9 (New Article 40a(2) to the TEU) (New Article 11(2) to the
TEU).
212 TREATY oF NICE art 2.1 (New Article 11(2) to the TEU). Presumably this Parliamentary
assent is by Parliament's usual voting procedures of a majority of votes cast. The section does
not state an order in which the measure is to be considered. Does the Council proceed to
consider the measure after Parliament has assented, or the reverse? Presumably the situation is
left flexible so that both bodies can consider the matter simultaneously. All that is required is
that both the Council and Parliament have approved. This right of Parliament was added in the
final negotiations of the text at Nice; it is not contained in the draft put forth by the Presidency.
See Revised Summary, supra note 205.
2"3 Admittedly the Treaty of Nice expands the role previously assigned to the Commission
in the AT. Under the AT, proposals for cooperation measures to be undertaken pursuant to AT
Article 43 and TEC Article I I were to be voted on by the Council upon presentation by the
Commission. The Treaty of Nice extends the Commission role of initiative to proposals for
cooperation throughout the Treaties, except the CFSP. See supra notes 167-72 and accompany-
ing text.
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participate is now controlled by a Union institution, the Commission.2 54 In a
sense, this may not be a significant change, as one of the requirements for
cooperation under the AT was that the measure be in the interest of the Union.
But it is not the member states interested in participating that will make this
determination, but the Commission. Despite the Treaty of Nice's rather
wholesale institutionalization of the cooperation procedure, the Treaty of Nice
does reinforce the constitutional stature of the principle of flexibility as
introduced by the AT. The traditional concept of uniformity is now constitu-
tionally juxtaposed with principles of flexibility.
I Of course, under the AT and the Treaty of Nice, cooperation measures are generally
effective only if approved by a Union institution, the Council of Ministers. But the Council is
the Union institution controlled by the member states. It is comprised of representative of the
member states who vote on the instruction of, and in the interest of, their national governments.
The Commission by contrast is independent of the member states, and it acts in what it perceived
to be in interests of the Union as an entity, not in the interests of the member states. See WYATr
& DASHWOOD, supra note 1, at 23-32.
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